


**YOUR TAXES AT WORK — IN MEXICO ■ DOES ABORTION CUT CRIME?**

MAY 9, 2005

# The American Conservative

**JOHN PAUL II**  
**1920-2005**



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## NO FORCING FRANCIS

I would like to commend Scott McConnell on his insightful tribute of Sam Francis (April 11). But I must quarrel with his assertion that “Sam was not a white nationalist.” Sam Francis was certainly more than just a white nationalist, but to deny the fact that he was a racial nationalist does a disservice to the man and to your magazine.

I appreciate the urge to resist lumping such a brilliant thinker in with your common beer-hall racist, but let’s not fool ourselves. I have read Sam Francis since the early ’90s, and there is simply no way that one can say that “white nationalist” is not an apt moniker for the man. Insufficient, maybe. Simplistic, certainly. But the label is most definitely apt.

This is not a value judgment. I’m just recognizing what is obvious. I loved and admired Dr. Francis’s keen analysis, and he certainly offered the world more than a David Duke or a Bo Gritz, but that is no reason to obfuscate reality.

I don’t buy that Francis was somehow forced into the writings he published, either. From what I can gather through his writing, Sam Francis was not “forced” into anything. Sam wrote what he believed and his “principle subject” (race) was his choice. It may be uncomfortable for Mr. McConnell, but it was not uncomfortable for Dr. Francis.

A.C. KLEINHEIDER  
Nashville, Tenn.

## WHITE MAN’S BURDEN

Scott McConnell’s remembrance of Sam Francis is wise and affectionate but mistaken on a few points. “Sticking up for white people” did become the central theme of Sam’s later writing but not, as Mr. McConnell suggests, because Sam was shut out of more comfortable conservative circles and was expected to satisfy an avid, if limited audience. It was because Sam gen-

uinely believed—as do I and many of his admirers—that whites as a group face what may be the greatest crisis of their existence.

Many whites now welcome—or at least think it immoral to oppose—their displacement by others. Non-whites, who have a firm sense of their own group interests, have been quick to exploit this strange form of psychological capitulation. Sam’s overriding political purpose was to rekindle among whites a sense of their legitimate interests as a group, without which he feared they had no long-term prospects for survival as a distinctive people with a distinctive culture.

Such a white reawakening would not, as McConnell writes, require “giving up on present American culture, both religious and secular.” It would require only sloughing off a thin, poisonous post-1950s accretion, most of which I am sure McConnell would be delighted to see disappear.

JARED TAYLOR  
via e-mail

## Scott McConnell replies:

The two above letters reflect an ambiguity in my use of the term “white nationalist,” which I regret. If the term is taken to mean, as in some circles it certainly does, a desire for return to a “white America,” either through enforced separatism and ethnic cleansing or a return to the petty apartheid of the pre-World War II South, then the Sam Francis I knew had no part in it. If it means wholehearted opposition to the more flamboyantly anti-white aspects of liberal multiculturalism—that is, the regime of discriminatory racial quotas; an assault on the American remembrance of white historical figures; the propagation of guilt among American whites for the purported crimes of their ancestors; the manipulation of hate-crime statistics; and a mass immigration policy designed,

implicitly or explicitly, to bring about an ethnic upheaval in American society—then Sam’s work would certainly fit the bill.

## CREATIVE DESTRUCTION

With regard to Leon Hadar’s article (“Operation Iranian Freedom?” April 25), I’ve come to realize that many people who oppose the war in Iraq or the potential war in Iran do not realize the truly significant success of this war.

Destabilization of a state sponsor of terror is the greatest success we could achieve. We have destabilized Iraq, which eliminates a source of stability to create or build weapons of mass destruction. Although none were found in Iraq, we have eliminated an entire infrastructure bent on being an enemy to the United States and her allies in the Middle East. Now we get to build from the foundation a new government.

Many will argue that the instability has created a new haven for terrorist recruits. The success behind this is that most will die on the battlefields of Iraq instead of directing their hatred within the U.S.


Perhaps a revolution, backed by the United States military, will bring instability to Iran. It sure beats the possibility of Rafsanjani and his allies building a nuclear arsenal that would become a threat to us.

JOHN MOUNADI  
Rockville, Md.

Correction: Due to an editing error in our April 11 issue, Claes Ryn’s characterization of *National Review* as “formerly more conservative” was rendered “formerly conservative.” *TAC* regrets.

*The American Conservative* welcomes letters to the editor. Submit by e-mail to [letters@amconmag.com](mailto:letters@amconmag.com), by fax to 703-875-3350, or by mail to 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209.

DOUG GRISWOLD/KRT



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## [DIPLOMACY]

### WMD FOUND!

Though Israel claimed its Dimona facility was a manganese plant (at other times a textile factory), it's been accepted since 1960 that Israel is a nuclear power—though it has refused to declare itself, submit to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, or comply with arms proliferation treaties. Whether by political pressure or *realpolitik* assessments of the regional balance of power, the U.S. has generally been willing to overlook its ally's noncompliance—until now.

While the president continues to focus on North Korea and Iran—both signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, unlike Israel—his State Department has taken the unprecedented step of calling on Israel to forswear use and accept IAEA regulations, though not give up its arsenal. The statement calls for nothing in the “foreseeable future” but marks a major shift from customary avoidance of any confirming reference to Israel's nuclear capability.

## [POSTWAR]

### STRIKE OUT

Basic rule of espionage: never trust an informant named Curveball. Amended rule of espionage for neoconservatives: trust an informant named Curveball if he tells you what you want to hear.

Fourteen months, 600 pages, and \$10 million later, we have another report to tell us what we already know: the case for war was cooked. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction has returned a verdict: “We conclude that the Intelligence Community was dead wrong in almost all of its prewar judgments...”

Central to the narrative is a relative to a Chalabi aide—call me Curveball—who spun the WMD fantasies that outfitted Colin Powell's UN presentation and George Tenet's 2002 National Intelli-

gence Estimate. (We now learn that Curveball wasn't even in Iraq during the time he claimed to have been working on WMD systems.) The Foreign Service told the CIA that their informant was “typical of individuals we would normally assess as fabricators,” and a DOD employee “was concerned about Curveball's apparent hangover during their meeting.” A foreign government told the CIA that the key to their case had suffered a “nervous breakdown” and was “crazy.”

According to this report, the night before Powell's speech—Tenet was working with him—a high-level CIA official cautioned the director about Curveball's unreliability. His warning was ignored; the secretary of state told the world, “Every statement I make today is backed up by solid sources”; Iraq was pummeled for weapons it didn't have; and Tenet was given the Medal of Freedom for being “dead wrong.”

## [PUBLIC OPINION]

### REPUBLICAN DEMOCRATS

CBS/*New York Times* poll: “Should the United States try to change a dictatorship to a democracy where it can, or should the United States stay out of other countries' affairs?”

51 percent of Republicans said we should “try to change” other countries' political systems compared to just 13 percent of Democrats. Conversely, 78 percent of Democrats wanted no part of the democracy-promotion business, believing that we should “stay out”; 33 percent of Republicans agreed.



## [MIDEAST]

### TROUBLE IN PARADISE

When selling their war, neoconservatives promised that planting freedom's seeds in Iraq—aka leveling it—would inaugurate a springtime of democracy across the Middle East. Moreover, these little democrats would love us, live peacefully, and pump oil. Enter the law of unintended consequences, trenchantly observed in *Ha'aretz*, beneath the banner, “Pro-democracy, anti-US.” Author Zvi Bar'el writes,

...[T]he American administration and Bush in particular are perceived as a scourge. Reform movements in Egypt, Iran, Lebanon or Syria, whose members are ready to be killed for democracy in their country, go berserk the moment they are accused of receiving American funds or contributions. To attain public legitimacy, it appears that each of these movements needs an anti-American slogan in addition to the pro-democracy slogan. ... One sign raised in the demonstration in Egypt said, ‘No to America, Yes to democracy.’

## [ECONOMICS]

### MOST FAVORED NATION

“India and China together can reshape the world,” said Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on April 11. The occasion was the signing of an agreement with Chinese premier Wen Jiabao that moves the two countries toward resolving a longstanding boundary dispute—

but there is good reason to think that economics, not geography, was uppermost on both leaders' minds.

Wen's visit to the world's largest democracy earlier brought him to the offices of such Indian outsourcing firms as Tata and Infosys, whose chief product is the displacement of American workers. Wen proposed in Bangalore, one of India's high-tech hubs, that Chinese hardware and Indian programmers together could dominate the world's markets. "I strongly believe that if we join hands together we will certainly be able to set a new trail in the IT-business world. Combined, we can take the leadership position," he said.

The closeness between Beijing and New Delhi comes with a strategic component as well: according to the *International Herald Tribune*, "China was also understood to have promised to back India's bid for permanent membership of an expanded UN Security Council." Reshaping the world indeed.

#### [IMMIGRATION]

### **JOBS BUSH WON'T DO**

To President Bush, they are "vigilantes," but to the beleaguered residents of Cochise County, Arizona, they are much needed reinforcements. The Minuteman Project was conceived as a way for citizens to call attention to the perilous situation at the Arizona-Mexico border, repeatedly penetrated by illegal immigrants in the face of U.S. government indifference.

The Minutemen are often caricatured as some right-wing militia, and any large group of this nature is bound attract some less than desirable characters. But the project would be entirely unnecessary if the federal government were doing its job to protect the borders. And in this, the Minutemen can justifiably claim some success: they have focused the media's attention on this issue and forced Bush administration to do its duty

by dispatching more border patrol agents to Arizona. Californians no doubt wonder when their Minutemen are coming.

#### [POLITICS]

### **BAIT & SWITCH**

Some in the blogosphere hoped they had happened upon another Dan Rather "Memogate" scandal, but it wasn't meant to be. The memo advising Republicans that Terri Schiavo's plight was a "great political issue" turned out to be the work of a GOP staffer in the office of Sen. Mel Martinez (R-Fla.).

The aide enthused that the debate over reinserting Schiavo's feeding tube was "a tough issue for the Democrats." This crass political calculation is another reminder that many Republicans see the values social conservatives hold dear as a way to win votes rather than as legitimate concerns to be addressed. The "pro-life base" is supposed to be "excited" by hastily conceived, last-minute, and tragically futile legislation.

It's hard to imagine GOP leaders handling something like tort reform this way. Pro-lifers get symbolism and condescension; donors get results.

#### [TAXES]

### **FEEDING LEVIATHAN**

After April 15, it comes as a relief to forget about taxes as quickly as possible. This year that would have been premature. According to the Tax Foundation, the date on which the average American earned enough to pay his state, federal, and local taxes came two days after the deadline for filing with the IRS; every penny you earned before April 17 might just as well have gone directly to Uncle Sam and his 50 dependents. The Tax Foundation reports that government consumes some 29.1 percent of Americans' income: "Americans ... spend more on taxes than they spend on food, clothing and medical care combined," notes Scott Hodgson, the group's president. ■

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## CAFTA: Last Nail in the Coffin?

With U.S. prisons filling up with aliens, 10 million illegals here and counting, Californians fleeing east, savage Salvadorian gangs battling with machetes inside the

Beltway, and Minutemen headed for the Arizona border, Rip Van Republican has awakened to the threat of open borders. Meanwhile, the White House dozes on.

But just as the chickens are coming home to roost on the Bush failure to defend America's frontier, so they will soon be coming home on Bush's embrace of free-trade fanaticism.

As I write, the Department of Commerce has just released the trade deficit numbers for February. Again, the monthly trade deficit set a record, \$61 billion. In January-February 2005, the annual U.S. trade deficit was running \$100 billion above the all-time record of \$617 billion in 2004.

In the mail this week came the annual graphs and tables from Charles McMillion of MBG Information Services, who has patiently chronicled the decline and fall of the once-awesome U.S. industrial machine. Since 1992, when some of us urged the president's father not to grant MFN to China, the returns are these:

- Between 1993 and 2004, the U.S. trade deficit with Beijing grew 700 percent to \$162 billion.
- In the last decade, China's total trade surplus at U.S. expense was \$805 billion.
- China's leading exports to us, which account for almost half her \$162 billion trade surplus, came from shipments of computers, electrical machinery, and parts.
- Leading U.S. exports to China (Boeing alone excepted) were, in

ascending order: meat, meat offal, fibers, ore, slag, ash, organic chemicals, fertilizers, copper, cereals, raw hides, skins, pulp of wood, cotton, and the big seller—oil seeds and oleaginous fruits (soybeans). All very, very high-tech stuff.

China's surplus, the largest one nation has ever run against another, provides her with the hoard of cash to buy Russian and Western weaponry to menace Taiwan and the 7th Fleet and pile up the T-bills that give Beijing the leverage it enjoys today over the sinking U.S. dollar and shaky U.S. prosperity.

In the 1993 battle of NAFTA, the Clinton-Gore-Dole-Gingrich globalists predicted our trade surplus with Mexico would grow, Mexico would prosper, and illegal immigration would be easier to control. Either they deceived us, or they deceived themselves. For since NAFTA passed:

- The U.S. trade surplus with Mexico has vanished and the annual trade deficit is now running above \$50 billion a year.
- The cumulative trade deficit with Mexico is now over \$300 billion.
- 1.5 million illegal aliens are caught each year crossing our border and 500,000 make it in to take up residence and enjoy all the social programs a generous but over-taxed America can provide.

With Chrysler now a German company, GM and Ford down to less than half the U.S. auto market, and GM paper

looking like Argentine bonds, Americans now import \$188 billion worth of autos, trucks, and parts, three times what we export. Motown is no more king of the road.

With three million manufacturing jobs lost under Bush, the U.S. dollar looking like Monopoly money, trade deficits exploding, and our dependence on foreigners for oil, the critical components of our weapons, and the cash to finance our insatiable appetite for consumer goods all growing, one would think even Bush Republicans might pause before taking another great leap forward into a future of global free trade. One would be wrong.

For CAFTA, son of NAFTA, is at hand: the Central American Free Trade Agreement. The White House will bring it up, but only if enough Republicans can be bamboozled into going along. In return for access to our market, we get access to five Central American markets and the Dominican Republic—with a total economy the size of New Haven's—47 million consumers, half of whom are living in poverty by *their* standards.

The highest per capita income in Central America is \$9,000 a year in Costa Rica, which is less than the U.S. minimum wage. But CAFTA will enable agribusiness and transnational companies to set up shop in Central America to dump into the U.S. and drive our last family farmers out of business and kill our last manufacturing jobs in textile and apparel.

If there are any Reagan Democrats left still loyal to the GOP, CAFTA may see them off. For if the GOP passes CAFTA over Democratic opposition, Hillary's party may just be able to take back North Carolina, Ohio, and a couple of bright red farm states as well. ■

[Pope John Paul II, 1920-2005]

# Upon This Rock

Defender of an unfashionable morality

By Thomas E. Woods Jr.

ALTHOUGH Pope John Paul II's health had been visibly declining for years, his death in April still came as a shock to a great many Catholics and non-Catholics alike. In an age of mass media he became the most visible and widely traveled pope in history, and Vatican observers agreed that he would be an immensely difficult act to follow.

It will be interesting to see how historians assess his pontificate. The mainstream media's routine characterization of Karol Wojtyla as a conservative obscures the many ways in which this son of Poland was a truly enigmatic figure. For Wojtyla, and later John Paul II, cannot be so easily pigeonholed. To be sure, he upheld traditional Catholic teaching on abortion, artificial contraception, homosexuality, and a great many other issues. But (to take one example among many) he gave a peccatorial cross, a symbol of authority, to the Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury—whose moral views are quite scandalous to Catholic sensibilities—in spite of Pope Leo XIII's statement on the invalidity of Anglican orders. Accused of insensitivity to women, John Paul, a fervent opponent of women priests, in 1994 permitted female altar servers—a capitulation that stunned and demoralized even many of his staunchest supporters.

But that is by no means the whole story of John Paul II. When he issued

*Veritatis Splendor* (1993), a lengthy encyclical on moral theology, even the traditionalist Society of Saint Pius X cheered. The late Michael Davies, the most prolific traditionalist writer in the English-speaking world, had nothing but praise for John Paul's Holy Office—known since Vatican II as the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF)—for what he called its consistently orthodox statements, particularly in the area of medical ethics, where Catholic moral principles frequently needed to be applied to previously unheard-of situations.

Among the bishops today, again contrary to media portrayals, there are next to no conservatives or traditionalists of the mold, say, of Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, one of Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger's predecessors at the Holy Office. John Paul himself was a fervent believer in the program of Vatican II, properly understood, and belonged to the center-right of a Vatican spectrum well to the left of where it had been in the days of Pius XII. Thus while he was certainly no traditionalist, as the many innovations of his pontificate reveal, John Paul was a consistent disappointment to self-described progressives, who sought more radical revolution in the church. He would have no truck with the ordination of women to the priesthood, which he insisted was beyond the church's

authority, and he would not relax the rule of priestly celibacy despite growing pressure to do so.

To hear the Left tell it, John Paul was a merciless disciplinarian and a pontiff who concentrated all power in his hands. On his way to Rome for the pope's funeral, Bill Clinton claimed that John Paul "centralized authority in the papacy again." Nothing could be further from the truth: John Paul's governing style was in fact relatively *laissez-faire*, and in the spirit of collegiality he generally deferred to the judgment of local bishops. James Hitchcock, a conservative Catholic professor at Saint Louis University, describes John Paul as "a relatively permissive pope. He has an image of a hardheaded conservative, which is probably based mostly on his words, but he has not been a disciplinarian."

To be sure, then, this was a man who defied simple categorization. These nuances notwithstanding, the image Pope John Paul II projected to the world was that of a defender of immemorial wisdom and moral precept. And it was that to which so many people responded.

Karol Wojtyla was not especially well known before his elevation to the papacy in 1978, and in fact when his name was announced from the balcony of St. Peter's that October, at least one



observer in the perplexed crowd exclaimed that the cardinals had elected an African. But once it became clear that the new pope, who took the name John Paul II (in honor of Pope John XXIII and Paul VI, the popes of Vatican II), was a Pole, few could miss the significance of what the College of Cardinals had done. For how could the election of a pope from a country behind the Iron Curtain not be viewed as a direct challenge to the Soviet Union and its domination of Eastern Europe?

That, in fact, was precisely how the Kremlin did interpret the elevation of Cardinal Wojtyla to the papacy. And when the pope announced the following year that he wished to travel to his homeland, Communist authorities panicked. Weeks before the pope's visit, the Polish Communist Party sent a cautionary memo to schoolteachers. "The pope is our enemy," it stated flatly. "Due to his uncommon skills and great sense of humor he is dangerous, because he charms everyone, especially journalists. Because of the activation of the Church in Poland our activities designed to atheize the youth not only cannot diminish but must intensely develop.... In this respect all means are allowed and we cannot afford any sentiments."

The largest crowd ever assembled in Poland's history, perhaps two or three million, gathered for the pope's June 10 mass. Looking around at so many of their fellow countrymen, the Poles realized in dramatic fashion just how numerous were those who were prepared to defy the regime and, by contrast, how few the Communists were.

Anna Bohdziewicz was an underground book distributor around the time of the pope's initial visit to Poland. "I think it broke some kind of fear," she said. "I'm sure because suddenly people saw that there were a lot of people who feel the same, who think the same, and

this was a kind of power." Krzysztof Rybicki, the pope's boyhood friend, felt the same way. "We had the feeling of something happening. We also could count ourselves and say, 'Look! We are so many!'"

"Fifty percent of the collapse of Communism is his doing," said Solidarity leader and former Polish president Lech Walesa last month. Just over a year after the pope's visit, Solidarity was able to organize 10 million Poles against the regime. "Earlier we tried, I tried, and we couldn't do it," Walesa recalled. "These are facts." Without the leadership of John Paul, "Communism would have fallen, but much later and in a bloody way."

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the Solidarity activist who later became Poland's first elected prime minister after the collapse of the Communist regime, pointed to the pope's visit as an essential starting point for the freedom movement. Thanks to that event, he said, "society felt its strength and saw that it was able to organize itself against the existing system—and especially toward a peaceful fight.... When martial law was implemented [in late 1981], the pope never gave up. He constantly spoke about Solidarity—about holding it up and keeping it alive."

Even the mainstream media acknowledges this. In the wake of John Paul's death, commentators across the political spectrum gave credit where it was due and honored the pope for the inspiration he gave to opponents of Communism. "Pope Helped Overthrow Communism in Europe," read the Associated Press headline on April 1.

What kinds of things did he tell the Poles? Peggy Noonan recalled some of John Paul's remarks in her own tribute to the late pontiff. In the midst of an atheistic regime he appealed to Poland's thousand years of Catholic belief:

With what argument, what reasoning, what value held by the will or the heart does one bring oneself, one's loved ones, one's countrymen and nation to reject, to say 'no' to Him with whom we have all lived for one thousand years? He who formed the basis of our identity and has Himself remained its basis ever since....

As a bishop does in the sacrament of Confirmation so do I today extend my hands in that apostolic gesture over all who are gathered here today, my compatriots. And so I speak for Christ himself: 'Receive the Holy Spirit!'

I speak too for St. Paul: 'Do not quench the Spirit!'

I speak again for St. Paul: 'Do not grieve the Spirit of God!'

You must be strong, my brothers and sisters! You must be strong with the strength that faith gives! You must be strong with the strength of faith! You must be faithful! You need this strength today more than any other period of our history....

Never lose your trust, do not be defeated, do not be discouraged.... Always seek spiritual power from Him from whom countless generations of our fathers and mothers have found it. Never detach yourselves from Him. Never lose your spiritual freedom.

The Soviet Union's obvious displeasure both at the election of this Polish pope and at the inspiration he gave to anti-Communist elements behind the Iron Curtain fueled speculation that the Kremlin may have been behind the failed assassination attempt on John Paul II by Turkish gunman Mehmet Ali Agca in May 1981. Such speculation may not have been far off: according to recent



reports in two major Italian newspapers, *Corriere della Sera* and *Il Giornale*, documents found in the archives of the old East German secret service implicate the Communists in the assassination attempt, which they say was carried out by the Bulgarian secret service.

John Paul himself, who later met with Ali Agca in jail and forgave the man who had shot him, always suspected that the gunman was part of a larger plot. "Ali Agca is, as everyone says, a professional assassin," the pope wrote in his book *Memory and Identity*. "Which means that the assassination was not his initiative, that someone else thought of it, someone else gave the order." A charismatic pope who traveled widely, moved easily among the people, and—especially—rallied the Poles against their oppressors was, apparently, too much for Communist authorities to bear.

But the overthrow of Communism, as John Paul well knew, was a necessary but not sufficient condition for re-establishing in Eastern Europe the kind of decent and dignified life that befits human beings. Returning to Poland for a fourth time in mid-1991, well after the collapse of the Communist regime, the pope made clear his displeasure at the direction of Polish society and of Europe in general:

Giving in to desire, to sex, to consumption: that is the Europeanism that some supporters of our entry into Europe think we should accept. But we mustn't become part of that Europe. We were the ones who created Europe, and with much more effort than those who claim exclusive rights to Europeanism. What is their criterion? Freedom. But which freedom? The freedom to take the life of an unborn child? Brothers and sisters, I protest against this concept of Europe held by the West. And this

message must be shouted loudly from this land of martyrs. Europe is waiting for redemption. The world needs a redeemed Europe.

When you listen to young priests and seminarians speak of John Paul, what they recall about him with the most fondness was the impression he gave of a man who was immovable on matters of moral principle. Young people, they say, are suffering from a vacuum of moral leadership and John Paul, alone among world leaders, was able to fill that vacuum. If they're looking for someone who slavishly conforms to political and moral fashion, they can find him in any of the interchangeable mediocrities who have ruled the nations of the West for the past half century. When John Paul urged them to be the light of the world and to resist what he unforgettably labeled the culture of death, he was reminding them that there was another way to live apart from the mere gratification of their appetites.

It was in this context in *Veritatis Splendor* that the pope recalled the words of Saint Paul:

Once you were darkness, but now you are light in the Lord; walk as children of the light (for the fruit of the light is found in all that is good and right and true), and try to learn what is pleasing to the Lord. Take no part in the unfruitful words of darkness, but instead expose them.... Look carefully then how you walk, not as unwise men but as wise, making the most of the time, because the days are evil. (Eph. 5:8-11, 15-16; cf. 1 Th. 5:4-8)

John Paul emphatically insisted that the fundamental problem with Communism had been moral and spiritual, not economic, and yet even in this latter category the pope had much of value to say.

Although John Paul favored the same kinds of protections for workers on which his predecessors had insisted, his 1991 encyclical *Centesimus Annus* nevertheless acknowledged the material and moral significance of the market economy. It is true that Pope Leo XIII, who condemned socialism in his seminal *Rerum Novarum* (1891), had never condemned capitalism *per se*, although he did believe that some forms of state intervention into the marketplace were desirable. Still, the church's leadership had often been skeptical of the market economy; Pope Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931) criticized capitalism in perhaps the most hostile language of any of the major social encyclicals. In *Populorum Progressio* (1967), Pope Paul VI even lent the support of the Chair of Peter to foreign-aid programs and state-led development schemes that were being denounced by free-market economists and which more and more observers now concede wound up harming the nations they were intended to help.

Under John Paul, the church began to make its peace with the market economy. According to Acton Institute president Fr. Robert Sirico, *Centesimus* "represents the beginning of a shift away from the static, zero-sum economic worldview that led the church to be suspicious of the system of free exchange and to argue for wealth distribution as the only moral response to poverty. Clearly, John Paul II has incorporated the developments in economic science since the time of Keynes. Not only does the encyclical synthesize advances in economics with Catholic normative principles, but it also reaffirms the autonomy of economics as a legitimate and positive discipline."

John Paul also spent the past quarter century as a consistent voice for peace. Most recently, he was an outspoken opponent of the Bush administration's drive toward war with Iraq. John Nichols

reminds us that in addition to meetings with British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, both Bush allies, in order to try to stave off the war, the pope also sent Cardinal Pio Laghi to the United States as a special envoy for the same purpose.

For his opposition to U.S. wars, John Paul II earned the withering contempt of so many of the neoconservatives who can be heard to praise him now. "The Bush Administration," wrote Joseph D'Hippolito in a charming little article for David Horowitz's FrontPageMag.com in May 2004, "should consider placing the Vatican on the list of rogue states that support terrorism." After all, what reason other than support for terrorism could anyone have for opposing the American Jacobins who control U.S. foreign policy? The neocons had better get used to it, however, since the next pope is certain to have the same views on international affairs as John Paul and by virtue of being younger and more physically vigorous will be an even more formidable opponent.

Only the passage of time will reveal how religious historians will evaluate the pontificate of John Paul II in terms of its legacy for the Catholic Church. Yet it is clear enough how historians of the 20th-century will evaluate him as a global statesman. He will be remembered the way the media portrayed him: as a defender of unfashionable moral principles before a world determined to flout them. And even his toughest critics have to concede, as the secular world does, John Paul's role in lighting the fire that culminated in Solidarity and the eventual collapse of the Soviet empire. It is for these traits that Catholics, looking back on the third-longest pontificate in church history, rightly honor him. ■

*Thomas E. Woods Jr. is the author of the just released How the Catholic Church Built Western Civilization.*

[fall of the House of Windsor]

## Courting Disaster

Monarchy has served England well, but now her prince hastens its decline.

By Peter Hitchens

THE LAST GREAT MONARCHY in the world is in the process of cutting its own throat. Should anybody care? Or is the proper response to shrug, smile, and pass by? Many conservative Americans are unable to understand Britain's continued adherence to this strange institution, seeing it as a survival from our national childhood that we have not yet found the courage to put away.

They may be right about the appeal of crowns and thrones to the child in us, in one way. All nations first seek to make their citizens love them in infancy, and the country that has no appeal to its children is unlikely to be much liked by them when they grow up. There is something about the word "king," with its echoes of chivalry and honor, that touches the heart in a way that the word "president" never can.

But they may also be dangerously wrong in an era in which the expression "democracy" is coming more and more to be used to describe a dogmatic, intolerant ideology frequently indifferent to liberty and often hostile to it. It is worth noting that, of the six longest-surviving law-governed democracies on the planet, four are constitutional monarchies (Britain, Australia, Canada, and Sweden) and two (Switzerland and the United States) are republics. The 49th parallel has long been the most interesting frontier in the world because it marks the division not between two hos-

tile and distinct peoples or two rival empires but between two different English ideas about how to be free.

Seldom has the United States' choice seemed so beset with difficulties, with the great republic's unending state of proclaimed war serving as a pretext for monstrous executive power and the blithe spurning of supposedly sacrosanct principle. This might be a good moment to examine the strengths of America's only real rival in the continuous preservation of ordered liberty, if only because the world will sooner or later recover from its present delusions, and civilized people will once again be seeking the essence of the good society. Such a society, once discovered, does not necessarily endure. Those who are in it do not always understand what is good about it, why it survives or what should be done to defend it. In attempting to save it, they can easily destroy it.

The grandeur and mystery of the English monarchy departed long ago, blasted away by familiarity and by television's greed for fake intimacy. This is an appetite that can never be satisfied, especially by an institution whose majesty has to be maintained by very ordinary mortals. Brilliant and charismatic beings could never stand the humble, middle-class drudgery and plain duty required of the British royal family. Its dignity was ruptured by the mad soap opera of Princess Diana's

vengeance, a revenge that continued to rage beyond the grave and that still fills the breasts of the princess's partisans with righteous fury against Prince Charles and the Wicked Woman he preferred all along, Camilla Parker Bowles. A wise fear of raising Diana's ghost, and of inflaming the mob of her sympathizers, had until now prevented the prince from marrying his mistress.

If that were the only obstacle, it would have been bad enough. But there are others that could never possibly have been overcome. This is a pity. Many conservative-minded people heartily wish that Charles had married Camilla Shand (as she was when they originally met) in the first place. Diana shimmered amid a miasma of costly scent, was adored by the camera—in real life she was far more angular, plain, and awkward than pictures suggest—and wore clothes so beautifully that she might have been designed for them rather than the other way round. This was not very British of her. The women of our damp island have traditionally been built for comfort rather than elegance. Diana broke so completely with this tradition that she might almost have been a foreigner of some kind. To those who yearned for the old style—shapeless cardigans, broad behinds, and sensible shoes—Camilla was much more the thing. She brought with her a whiff of damp dog, and that richer waft which comes from stables and honest English mud. In photographs and on TV, she looks alarmingly like the horses she rides so well, and her attempts to be chic are engagingly hopeless. She might have been an excellent queen.

But she cannot be queen, except in name. It will never stick. The absurd, bureaucratic nuptials of Charles and Camilla had become a source of merri-ment in Britain long before they took place. This was partly because of Charles's constant Eeyore-like luckless-

ness and the unfortunate impression he gives of thinking that being a prince is all so jolly unfair. It was partly because of the unending practical problems. The queen wouldn't attend, the location had to be changed, and then the whole thing had to be put off so as not to coincide with the pope's funeral. But it is really because he has broken rules that he is obliged to keep. When the existence of your future post depends entirely upon ancient custom, precedents, and tradition, you cannot really dispense with such things because it suits you personally.

But Charles has done so, and by this action he has destabilized his own throne. Under proper English law, it was probably illegal for the heir to the throne and supreme governor of the Church of England to wed in a civil ceremony. Many of the country's keenest legal brains certainly thought so. He is supposed to be joined in holy matrimony

first pretended that it did not exist. Then they acknowledged that it might, when a legal opinion written by one of England's greatest jurists, the late Lord Kil-muir, was unearthed from the archives. Finally, wreathed in joyous smiles, they proclaimed that the wedding was validated by the Human Rights Act, a pestilent new law under which liberal judges can permit almost anything they like and prevent almost anything they don't, much as the U.S. Supreme Court misinterprets the Constitution. One day, this act may be used to invalidate the monarchy itself, which with its male line of succession and rules against Roman Catholics is a great boiling mass of "human rights" violations.

Prince Charles, in a clear breach of his supposed political neutrality, has in the past condemned the act that now permits him to marry. He said it would "only encourage people to take up causes which will make the pursuit of a

IN PHOTOGRAPHS AND ON TV, CAMILLA LOOKS ALARMINGLY LIKE THE HORSES SHE RIDES SO WELL, AND HER ATTEMPTS TO BE CHIC ARE ENGAGINGLY HOPELESS. SHE MIGHT HAVE BEEN AN EXCELLENT QUEEN.

according to the sonorous rites and ceremonies of his own church and in no other place. But he cannot be so married, mainly because his bride's divorced husband is still living and the Anglican Church is still technically opposed to the remarriage of divorced persons. (Do not be misled by the common historical error of supposing that the church was founded to give Henry VIII a divorce. What Henry wanted—and eventually got from his archbishops—was an annulment. He remained, in his own eyes at least, a good Catholic.)

When this serious problem was brought to the attention of the covertly republican Blair government, they at

sane, civilised and ordered existence ever more difficult." It must have given Blair particular pleasure to inform the heir to the throne that this very law was the only thing that would allow him to marry his intended. The New Labour government delights in "supporting" the monarchy in such difficulties. They provided similar support when all the wronged women of Britain—seemingly millions of them—had taken Diana's side against Charles after her death. Blair's advice to the royal family then was that they should humble themselves before the infuriated mob, a mob that Blair had helped to create by his use of the phrase "the People's Princess" to



describe this privileged aristocrat. Such help, as Vladimir Ilyich Lenin once said in another context, should not be welcomed by its recipient. It is like the support that the rope gives to the hanged man.

The prince has made matters even harder for himself by his commendable enthusiasm for the church's 16th-century prayer book, which in hard, shining Shakespearean English insists unambiguously that those who wed must forsake all others and that marriage ends only with death. It contains no rites for weddings such as Charles's second one, and by clear implication views them as breaches of a solemn oath. It is quite certain that Charles understands all this.

This marriage will eat away at the monarchy for years to come—the seemingly small breach of the rules that makes it impossible to insist upon those rules at a later date when it matters, the ever-dangerous precedent lurking in the shadows. The patient enemies of the British throne will always be waiting for an opportunity to exploit that precedent.

That is the nature of the danger, though of course it is only the latest in a long chapter of sad failures by the crown of England that within living memory was almost universally revered by the people of England. There is a haunting photograph that sums this up better than anything I have ever seen, an extraordinary glimpse of a world simultaneously immensely old and very recent. It is a somber afternoon in 1952, and the funeral train bearing the remains of King George VI on his last journey from London to Windsor is passing a group of platelayers. The locomotive bears the ancient royal crest on the front of its boiler, the lion and the unicorn, heavy and archaic. A great plume of steam and smoke darkens the sky. The railroad men are standing by the track, their heads bowed and their caps

in their hands. I do not think this picture was posed.

In the recently rediscovered "Instructions for American Servicemen in Britain, 1942," the perceptive anonymous author warned GIs, amid much other sage advice about cricket, beer, tea, girls, and swearing, "Be careful not to criticize the King. The British feel about that the way you would feel if anyone spoke against our country or our flag. Today's King and Queen stuck with the people through the blitzes and had their home bombed just like anyone else, and the people are proud of them." The booklet adds that within a seemingly old-fashioned framework, the

trary authority of the mighty. George Orwell noticed during the celebrations of King George V's silver jubilee in May 1935 that in the desperately poor East End of London there were banners proclaiming "Down with the landlords. God save the King," a faint echo of the ancient belief that the king would defend the peasant against the rapacious baron, if only he knew what was really happening.

England was free long before it was a democracy. This is because we like to enshrine our quarrels in unpredictable and sometimes ungovernable adversarial systems. Magna Carta, *habeas corpus*, jury trial, the presumption of

**TO BE A BRITISH SUBJECT IS IN MANY WAYS TO BE MORE FREE, LESS LOADED WITH OBLIGATIONS AND DUTIES TO THE STATE, THAN TO BE THE CITIZEN OF EVEN THE MOST ENLIGHTENED REPUBLIC.**

British "enjoy a practical, working twentieth-century democracy which is in some ways even more flexible and sensitive to the will of the people than our own."

Both pieces of advice were right at the time. The British monarchy was and remains like a complex knot, tied with such skill and ingenuity that few can understand how it holds together, and it is almost impossible to undo. It is absolutely not a survival of feudal absolutism. On the contrary, it has been a subtle device that, used properly, both permits democracy and keeps it from turning into tyranny. To be a British subject is in many ways to be more free, less loaded with obligations and duties to the state, than to be the citizen of even the most enlightened republic.

It contains several paradoxes. From very early in its history, the English crown came to be seen as the protector of the common people against the arbi-

trary authority of the mighty. George Orwell noticed during the celebrations of King George V's silver jubilee in May 1935 that in the desperately poor East End of London there were banners proclaiming "Down with the landlords. God save the King," a faint echo of the ancient belief that the king would defend the peasant against the rapacious baron, if only he knew what was really happening. England was free long before it was a democracy. This is because we like to enshrine our quarrels in unpredictable and sometimes ungovernable adversarial systems. Magna Carta, *habeas corpus*, jury trial, the presumption of innocence, common law, the right to silence, freedom from torture, limited punishment, and plural government all grew in the shadow of the throne, fertilized and nourished by quarrels between king and nobles, Norman and Saxon, crown and church, gentry and merchants, city and countryside, Whig and Tory. The same conflicts produced a lively, balanced, and bicameral parliament, *de facto* judicial independence from the executive, freedom of speech, the right to bear arms, the bar on the existence of a standing army, the protection against double jeopardy, and the establishment of an impartial civil service. All these things predated the arrival of universal suffrage, which the modern ideologues of benevolent invasion seem to believe is the necessary and sufficient condition for liberty in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Many of these precious possessions have recently been dismantled or

restricted by our enthusiastically democratic “People’s Government,” which stated in 1997 that it was the “political arm of the British people as a whole,” and which is the most republican administration in modern British history.

Cromwell’s 1649 experiment with a British republic ended with arbitrary rule and military government and was for centuries afterwards regarded with shuddering horror by sensible Englishmen. What they most disliked about Cromwell’s commonwealth was its lawlessness: the discovery that the toppling of a lawful throne led to a far worse autocracy than what had gone before. The extraordinary historic compromise of 1689, when England obtained its bill of rights, united Tory squires and former Cromwellians in support of a crown founded on continuity, Protestant Christianity, and the law.

The beautiful coronation service, a pivotal part of Britain’s written but unorganized constitution, is amongst other things a great hymn to the rule of law, a law originating in the Bible. As trumpets sound and cannon are fired from the Tower of London, the new monarch promises above all to defend “law and justice in mercy,” all originating from the Gospel of Christ. Saint Peter’s exhorta-

used to the “terror and punishment of evildoers” and the defense of the righteous. There is no official version of the British national anthem (itself an interesting fact), but one of its most significant lines contains the hope “May he defend our laws.”

Enthusiasts for republican government in America rejected the establishment of religion mainly because of the intolerance and persecution long ago abandoned by the Church of England. Yet they have found it harder than they might have thought to keep God out of the state. He will keep slipping in, presumably because the mechanism of free government often works better when it calls on the divine for help, and the general sovereignty of God over the human conscience is the best formula ever devised for ordered liberty. The apparently more enlightened idea that power originates with the people, and that God has nothing to do with it, can be a dangerous staircase to climb or descend. There is no doubt that it goes both up and down.

It may sound very inspiring when a defendant is arraigned by the “People of the United States.” But who is to say who the people are or what the people want, and what if the people can be per-

mended constitution of the extremely enlightened Weimar Republic. Vishinsky’s source of authority was a revolution against a despised autocracy, a utopian political theory, and the apparently impeccable 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union.

Patriot Acts and wars against terror are obviously not the modern equivalent of Hitler’s Enabling Act or the use of the Reichstag fire as a pretext for the crushing of opposition. To make such a claim would be to devalue language and lose all sense of proportion. But can we be wholly sure that a system that can tolerate this much constitutional vandalism and this level of political dishonesty is proof against such dangers in a worse future?

For there is another great strength in a system based upon heredity and history, as monarchy is. It enfranchises the dead and enthrones experience. It acts, first of all, as a reminder that political leaders are tenants on a short lease. The crown was there before them and will be there when they have gone. What they do may be undone and they cannot bind their successors. It enshrines the importance of the married family as the principle fortress of private life and of inheritance as the foundation of private property. It diffidently whispers that justice and equity may have a divine source that cannot be amended. Above all, it provides a focus of loyalty that is not the government of the day.

The British police officer serves the crown and the law, not the government, and is free to refuse an illegal order from a political superior. The same is true for an officer in the armed services, a judge, or a civil servant. A British patriot may oppose a war he believes is wrong and yet remain loyal to the crown. It is not so easy for an American, whose president is party leader, commander in chief, and temporary monarch. The importance of this distinction is only underlined by the

## **CROMWELL’S 1649 EXPERIMENT WITH A BRITISH REPUBLIC ENDED WITH ARBITRARY RULE AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND WAS FOR CENTURIES AFTERWARDS REGARDED WITH SHUDDERING HORROR BY SENSIBLE ENGLISHMEN.**

tion to “submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord’s sake” and Christ’s advice to “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s” are pointedly read out from the King James Bible, which is presented to the new sovereign as the “lively oracles of God.” The great sword of state is granted on condition that it be

sued to desire something very nasty indeed—as they can be? There have been other people’s courts, notably those presided over by the National Socialist Roland Freisler and the Social Democrat turned Bolshevik Andrei Vishinsky, which were not so creditable. Freisler’s ultimate source of authority was a democratic election and the una-

alarming fact that Britain's current government has made so many cumulative attacks on these aspects of the monarchical constitution.

Unelected political appointees have for the first time been given the legal power to command impartial officials. A new "Serious Organised Crimes Agency," ludicrously dubbed the "British FBI" though we have no federal structure, will be staffed by officers employed by the state rather than sworn to uphold the law. Large numbers of Community Support Officers, likewise state employees responsible only to their superiors, are rapidly replacing sworn constables as the basic patrolling unit of the police. The prime minister has become fond of posing among soldiers he plainly regards as his army. Meanwhile Mr. Blair's colleagues, in what may be Freudian slips, have taken to referring to him as head of state. Downing Street press conferences, with their lecterns and coats of arms, have clearly been modeled on White House practice. At the same time, the hereditary members of the House of Lords have been almost wiped out, leaving the crown exposed as the last part of the government still based upon inheritance. And the prime minister has developed a habit of seeking prominent positions at what used to be exclusively royal occasions, from the state opening of Parliament to the funerals of Princess Diana and the queen mother.

The signs are all there for those who would read them. Just when we need the crown most of all, and when we should be rallying round its besieged standard to defend it, the heir to the throne strikes a heavy blow at the foundations of the throne, and all we shall be left with in the end will be a parcel of useless "human rights." ■

*Peter Hitchens is a columnist for the London Mail on Sunday. He is the author of The Abolition of Britain.*

## Lights Out at GE

Bloomington's jobs are going south—with taxpayer help.

**By Timothy P. Carney**

BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA—"There was a time you couldn't find a place at the plant to park," says Joy Finley, who works at the Local 2249 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), which represents the manufacturing workers at the local General Electric plant. "Folks were getting towed."

On Thursday, March 31, however, the scene is starkly different in the GE parking lot just off Curry Pike on the outskirts of Bloomington. The lot is mostly empty. Nine out of every 10 autos here are American, which contrasts with the part of town near Indiana University, where about half of the cars are Japanese. Bumper stickers range from "Bush-Cheney-Daniels" to "Kick that son of a BUSH out." More than one car's bumper declares, "Jesus is Life: the rest is just details."

Many of those leaving the first shift after 3 p.m. (they started at 6:30 a.m.) are carrying empty crock pots or casserole dishes they brought for the retirement of someone on their line. About 70 were lucky enough to take retirement the day before the layoffs came. Friday would be the last day for another 470 workers.

According to the official story, the April Fools' Day layoffs were happening because GE planned to "discontinue production of mid-line, side-by-side refrigerator models that are not competitive on cost or product features." While that is technically true, a very similar new line of refrigerators is being started up at the GE plant in Celaya, Mexico. All the workers in Bloomington understand

that their jobs are being sent south of the border. And they all point the finger at the same two targets.

"Free trade and NAFTA are the worst things that have happened to the working man," says Tracy Pritchard, who worked at GE for 10 years until he was laid off April 1. He plans to go to school and maybe become an electrician. "I'm gonna stay outta factory work—not much future there." The other culprit? "Corporate greed"—a cliché at the plant and the union hall.

Pritchard, like his coworkers, didn't know it wasn't free trade, strictly speaking, that has helped GE move their jobs to Celaya. The corporate welfare state—specifically, the Export-Import Bank of the United States—played a role.

In Celaya, a General Electric joint venture named Mabe makes appliances, including the side-by-side refrigerators that had been made in Bloomington. As part of another joint venture called Qualcore, GE built a separate plant in Celaya to supply parts for the appliances made at Mabe. That's where the U.S. taxpayers got involved.

To reduce the cost of the Qualcore factory, GE called on the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im), a federal agency. Ex-Im provided a subsidy in the form of a \$3 million loan guarantee because the new plant would include components made in California and Illinois.

At the IBEW's office right behind a pawnshop, Joe Adams sits down to talk to me. He's the local vice president, but he's getting laid off by GE on Friday, after 10 years. He tells me about when



he was first looking for work. "They told me I couldn't get a factory job without factory experience. That didn't make sense. What's the experience you need?" Joe soon learned what was required. "Are you gonna be here, on time, every day? Are you experienced with the mundane? Can you stand to do the same thing again and again?"

Inside the plant, I see what Joe means. Work that an outsider might expect to be done by a machine—attaching a support bracket to a refrigerator's evaporator, for example—is done by hand. A conveyor belt carries the evaporator up to Patty McGinn, who picks it up, attaches the supports with a few simple motions, and puts it back down. Then she does it again. And again.

Patty stands out. Most workers at the plant look considerably older than their age. But with short blonde curls and a fresh face, Patty is in fact one of the more senior employees. She isn't getting laid off this time, but nobody here expects the plant to be around much longer.

Patty, like many at GE, met her husband at the plant. He can't read or write, and he started here before the plant required a high-school diploma. Many of the laborers, like Patty, started at age 20 or younger. This is part of what makes the layoffs so tough. These workers make \$20 to \$24 an hour. Without training or experience, in relatively low-cost Bloomington, they earn over \$41,000 (up to \$50,000) per year, plus benefits and possibly overtime. "Where else you gonna find this sort of money?" is the common refrain.

Some of the workers see how their generous wages relate to their jobs' southward motion. It's conventional wisdom in Bloomington that the Mabe workers make \$2 to \$3 an hour. "We knew labor costs were getting out of hand," says Glenn Collins, IBEW's local president. After NAFTA, the union took

a gamble and agreed to set up a two-tier wage structure. That means new employees get paid less than more senior workers—a radical idea in a union factory.

Corporate management, however, at the same time created new projects that would allow the recent hires to jump immediately to the same wage as everyone else, wiping out any savings this new union contract would have provided. For Collins, this was just one more example of GE's lack of intelligence when it comes to saving money in Bloomington. As he sees it, and he is not alone among the plant workers in this, manufacturing in America is doomed and has been doomed—some say since NAFTA; others think that agreement just expedited the inevitable.

Tony Smoot may be setting a record, getting laid off by GE for the third time. In 2000, when GE moved its biggest refrigerators (30 and 27 cubic feet) to Celaya, there was a round of layoffs. Some workers, including Smoot, were hired back after others retired. In 2001, in another round (as the 24- and 25-cubic-foot models went south), Smoot got the axe again. After a few months, he was back. This time he doesn't expect to be rehired. He agrees manufacturing is dead, and he thinks George W. Bush only makes things worse. "Bush says, 'buy American, buy American.' Hell, go to Wal-Mart. Ain't nothing made in America anymore," Smoot says. "You can't even buy an American flag that's made in this country."

Dennis Briscoe of Ellettsville shows up Thursday for his second-to-last day here. He began work at GE 13 years ago, after he was laid off from Otis Elevators, less than a mile down Curry Pike. Briscoe hopes to attend Ivy Tech, also just down the road, using federal funds provided by NAFTA in these situations. He will go into biotech or nursing. I ask him how he feels about both of his jobs

going to Mexico. "Hell," he says, with the same sad smile most of these workers have this week, "if I had my own business, I'd do the same thing."

On Friday, Jim Sips plans to work a double shift. That puts him in the plant from 6 a.m. to midnight. When I run into him, he's sitting on a chair, watching refrigerator casings go by him, checking to see if the paint job is even. He's wearing a Bush-Cheney inauguration t-shirt he got because he contributed to the 2004 campaign. "GE's been good to me," he says. Sips acknowledges that the plant will shut down entirely in the near future, but he doesn't blame the company. Even in the face of being laid off, he sees benefits to free trade. He points to his colleagues and says, "These folks complain about everything going down to Mexico, but they shop at Wal-Mart."

Sips also brings up a subject only the older workers will mention: America's work ethic. It's a subject Jeff Cain, a recent retiree, has no problem discussing with a reporter. "Americans are lazy," he says. After visiting his wife, who still works at the plant, Cain tells me, "Everybody wants a paycheck, but nobody wants to put in eight hours."

Collins, too, finds other culprits besides "corporate greed." In the union offices, he tells me, "In the U.S., we're constantly being monitored by OSHA. The EPA is on our case. ... Why take a beating from the EPA and OSHA when you can just build your stuff down in Mexico with nobody bothering you?"

Collins is keeping his job at the plant, and he's one of the few workers I tell about the Ex-Im deal that helped build GE's manufacturing setup in Celaya. Joe Adams is in the room, too. "Well, that's just great," Joe says. "My taxes are paying to ship my job to Mexico." ■

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# Doomed to Repeat It

Will the lessons of Iraq go unlearned?

By William R. Polk

ARE THERE ANY lessons to be learned from the American venture into Iraq? The great German philosopher of history Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel doubted our capacity to find out. "Peoples and governments," he wrote, "never have learned anything from history or acted on principles deduced from it." Writing about the Vietnam War, political scientist Samuel P. Huntington suggested that it would be best if policy-makers "simply blot out of their mind any recollection of this one." It seems that they did.

So, in at least some ways, the Iraq War has been proof of George Santayana's admonition that those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it. The urgent question today is whether the Iraq War will be similarly blotted out and similarly repeated. The odds are with Professor Hegel.

Huntington's argument was based on the notion that Vietnam was unique since, as he saw it, imperialism and colonialism have "just about disappeared from world politics." That is, they were fading memories of a now irrelevant past. But is this true?

Foreign domination has faded from our memory but not from the memories of many of the peoples of Asia and Africa. Focus on Iraq, which became "independent" by treaty with Britain in 1922. Then it became "independent" by recognition of the League of Nations in 1932. But few Iraqis believe that it became really independent by either of these acts. Britain controlled the econ-

omy and maintained its military presence while it continued to rule Iraq behind a façade of governments it had appointed. It then reoccupied the country during World War II. After the war, it ruled through a proxy until he was overthrown in 1958. So was 1958 the date of independence? On the surface yes, but below the surface American and British intelligence manipulated internal forces and neighboring states to influence or dominate governments; they helped to overthrow the revolutionary government of Abdul Karim Qasim and to install the Ba'ath Party, which ultimately brought Saddam Hussein to power. Knowing what they had done and fearing that they would do so again shaped much of the policy even of Saddam Hussein.

By giving or withholding money, arms, and vital battlefield intelligence, Britain and America influenced what Saddam thought he could do. So worried was he about his American connection that, before he decided to invade Kuwait, he called in the U.S. ambassador to ask, in effect, if the invasion was fine with Washington. Only when he was assured in 1990 that the U.S. had no policy on the frontiers with Kuwait by official testimony before Congress, by government press releases, and by a face-to-face meeting with our ambassador in Baghdad did he act. Either he misread the omens or we changed them. Our ambassador later said, incredibly, that we had not anticipated that he would take all of Kuwait. When he did, we invaded, destroyed much of his army

and the Iraqi economy, and imposed upon the country UN-authorized sanctions and unauthorized no-fly zones. Finally, in 2003, we invaded again, occupied the country, and imposed upon it a government of our choice. Whatever the justification for any or all of these actions, they do not add up to independence. Even Iraqis who hated and feared Saddam always felt that they were living under a form of Western control. The simple fact is that the memories had not faded because they were based on current reality.

There are many things to be said about the American invasion and occupation of Iraq. But one thing stands out: we were (and I believe still are) ignorant of Iraqi history and culture. More pointedly, we had (and still have) no sense of how Iraqis saw their own past and their relationships with us. This ignorance has caused us, often inadvertently, to take actions that many or perhaps most Iraqis have read as imperialist. This has been true even of actions that we felt were generous, far-sighted, and constructive.

Take the provision of a constitution as an example. Constitutions are surely good. We treasure ours even when we do not always abide by it. We believe that other countries should have them because they are the bedrock of democracy. That sentiment was so widely held at the end of the First World War that the British made giving the Iraqis one a high priority. Experts were called in, phrases were debated, studies were made of the

best then in operation, and finally, in 1924, a wonderful document emerged. It was greeted with great satisfaction but mainly by those who had given it, the British. Iraqis paid it little heed because it was not grounded in the realities of Iraqi society, practices, or even hopes. Time after time, governments came into power that overturned or simply neglected every paragraph it contained.

So what did the American occupation government do? Was it aware of this history? Apparently not. It set about writing a new constitution. The emphasis was, of course, on the occupation authorities. They wrote the constitution without any Iraqi input and just handed it to their appointed interim government. That, to my mind, amounted to astonishing insensitivity. What was even more astonishing was that it somehow never occurred to the American lawyers who wrote the new constitution that it would become worthless—that is, illegal—when the interim administration was replaced by even a quasi-independent government. It was surely the shortest-lived constitution ever written.

If constitutions are necessary for democracies, elections are even more so. Naturally, therefore, they too are good things. Iraq had to have one. Organizing and controlling it turned out to be a difficult task given what many Iraqis interpreted our election to mean: not to express a national consensus on democracy but to solidify our control over the country.

Because at least some Iraqis were determined to get us out of their country, using guerrilla warfare tactics and terrorism against us and those Iraqis who supported us, we had to use our military forces to set parameters on the issues, the personnel, and the form of this expression of freedom. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau long ago advocated, we decided to “force men to be free.” The fact that, however unfree they were,

the elections were indeed held was hailed as a great victory for democracy. I remain unconvinced. I suspect that two fatal flaws will soon become evident: a heightening of the divisive tendencies already inherent in Iraqi society and a devaluation of the very concept of representative government.

Our policies on security are similarly subject to different interpretation. Where we have done most of what we have done in the name of security, our critics in Iraq have sought sovereignty. We believed that security had to come first. A close reading of history leads me to believe that the order is usually the reverse. When foreigners get out, insurgencies stop; they do not stop, no matter how massive the force used against them or how costly in blood and treasure the fighting is, until the foreigners leave. This surely is the lesson of Ireland, Algeria, Chechnya, and even of our own revolution. I predict it will be that of Iraq too.

Believing that security comes first has led our government to concentrate on

could not defend itself; nor can most other states. Those that can are those that have the ultimate weapon. Acquisition of even a few nuclear weapons provides security because the cost of attacking a power armed with them is too high. I am told that at least some African, Asian, and even European observers believe that if Saddam Hussein had waited until he had a nuclear weapon before attacking Kuwait, we would not have gone to war. North Korea today reinforces this assessment. There we react with anger, economic sanctions, and propaganda but not with military force.

The process of acquiring nuclear weapons, however, is a time of deadly danger. So governments that decide to acquire them naturally try to move with the utmost secrecy and speed. They also usually seek to avoid provocations that might bring down upon them the wrath of the existing nuclear powers. That too is a lesson of Iraq: had Saddam not provided a provocation, we would probably not have gone to war. Indeed, we were

## IF SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD WAITED UNTIL HE HAD A NUCLEAR WEAPON BEFORE ATTACKING KUWAIT, WE WOULD **NOT HAVE GONE TO WAR.**

rebuilding an Iraqi army since doing so appeared to offer security at a bargain price. But Iraqis remember the terrible costs to their society of the creation of armies. The one the British created time after time subverted or overthrew civil governments. A new army, absent balancing civic institutions that can grow only slowly and by internal developments, will surely again pave the way for a military dictatorship.

Related to, but to some extent external to, Iraq are other lessons we should ponder. What happened to Iraq showed other governments that they live at the sufferance of the United States. Iraq

supplying him with the components and equipment to make weapons of mass destruction right up to the time of our intervention. Surely this lesson is in the minds of the Iranians today, as it was in the minds of the Russians, Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis, and Israelis. The only alternative to this highly dangerous and ruinously costly drift in international affairs is mutual disarmament, but current American policies are rushing us, and the world, in exactly the opposite direction.

Finally, there is a grab-bag of other lessons again laid before us by Iraq: the first is that war is always unpredictable



no matter how powerful the advantages one side seems to have at the beginning. The second is that wars are always horrible. Not only are people killed or severely harmed, but whole societies, even of the victors, are brutalized. This was true of the British in Kenya, French in Algeria, Americans in the Philippines, Russians in Central Asia, and Chinese in Tibet. Finally, guerrilla wars are, at best, unwinnable, lasting as in Ireland for centuries and in Algeria for a century and a half. The people of Chechnya suffered massacre, deportation, rape, and massive destruction for nearly four centuries and still is not "pacified." No one wins a guerrilla war; both sides lose. The only sensible policy is one that aims to stop such conflicts rather than to win them. Hegel and Santayana may be right; we may not learn. But certainly, Huntington is wrong in urging that we blot the lessons out of our minds. ■

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[oriental despotism]

## Red Sun Rising

The U.S. shouldn't presume that the PRC wants a peaceful future.

By James P. Pinkerton

BEIJING—As I watched the Chinese soldiers goose-stepping across Tiananmen Square, it occurred to me that maybe the U.S. and China weren't destined to be such close friends.

Once upon a time, people hoped that the logic of capitalism would knit countries together. In 1910, the British economist Norman Angell wrote *The Great Illusion*, arguing that it was illogical for industrial nations not to co-operate with each other, since confrontation—war—was so obviously catastrophic; the illusion was that a European war could be profitable or beneficial. Angell didn't prophesy that rich countries would never fight. He merely pointed out that if they did go to war, they would impoverish themselves. And in 1914, he was proven sadly correct.

The new great conventional wisdom, pushed by American neoconservatives and their fellow travelers, is that it is democratic nations that are naturally friendly toward each other. Democracy breeds tranquility. But *sacre bleu*, what about France, one of the world's oldest democracies? The French seem to be leading much of democratic Europe in an increasingly anti-American direction, as countries such as Italy and Ukraine withdraw their remaining forces from Iraq and the U.S. and the European Union go their separate ways on issues ranging from Iran to Airbus.

OK, that's Europe, which is mostly "old." But what about the rising democracies here in Asia? Aren't they more pro-American? Maybe, maybe not.

Earlier this year in Indonesia, the young democratic government did nothing when a Jakarta court sentenced Abu Bakar Bashir to a mere 30 months in jail, meting out meager punishment for his role in the conspiracy to firebomb 202 people to death in Bali three years ago. The U.S. and Australian governments protested Bashir's light sentence; the newspaper *The Australian* editorialized that the sentence was "an obscene slur against the memory of the innocent victims of the Bali bombing." Of course, in the bad old undemocratic days, high-powered protests from abroad might have had an impact on the Indonesian judicial system. That is, maybe a strongman in Jakarta would have tacked a few decades or centuries onto Bashir's jail time or arranged for him to be "accidentally killed while trying to escape." But nowadays, the popular passions of the Indonesians, all 238 million of them, must be taken into account.

So popular passion, also known as "majority rule," is good news for Bashir and his al-Qaeda-wannabe terrorist friends. Why? Let's be honest: there's a certain distinct sympathy in the Third World for brown people who kill white

people. According to the *South China Morning Post*, the venerable Hong Kong-based newspaper, Bashir's supporters thronged around the court building as they "waved banners and shouted anti-American, anti-Jewish and anti-Christian slogans." In addition, some protestors carried pictures of George W. Bush with his eyes cut out and the caption, "Drag and hang Bush." Meanwhile, the BBC reports that Bashir's lawyers are planning on appealing their client's brief prison sentence.

Back to China, which describes itself as a democracy with "Chinese characteristics." Westerners might dispute that China's system has any democratic features whatsoever. And one can even argue about the degree to which China has embraced free-market capitalism.

As I saw in Tiananmen Square, the Chinese have an aesthetic that, to a Westerner, looks fascist. Ominous-appearing indeed is the sharply dressed and smartly pressed unit of the People's Liberation Army, bayonets a-gleaming, that goes goose-stepping across Tiananmen every morning at dawn for the national flag-raising ceremony.

To be fair, lots of countries have strutting soldiers. But China goes further than most in its resurrection of abhorrent politico-military styles—as the world will soon see. In 2003, the government hired Albert Speer Jr., son of the famous Nazi architect/war criminal, to design a 10-mile axis running right through the center of Beijing. That will be the parade route for the 2008 Olympics. "His Beijing axis is re-awakening old memories," suggested an article in the German paper *Die Welt* two years ago: "Wasn't there a legendary north-south axis planned by the elder Speer for Hitler's new Berlin, which was to be called 'world capital Germania?' Is his son trying to copy him, or rather outdo him?"

For his part, Speer the younger denies any such intention, but the *New York Times* noted a connection between the father's design for the German Pavilion at the 1937 Paris World's Fair and the son's recent Expo 2000 in Hannover. In the politely shaded understatement of the *Times*, the son's project, 63 years later, bears "an uncanny parallel to one of his father's."

Peter Herz, a former American diplomat stationed in China, recalled for me an eerie conversation from a decade ago: when he told a Chinese associate that some of his ancestors came from Germany, the Chinese volunteered, "Oh, I think Hitler was a very great man." When he explained that his German kin were Jewish, the point didn't register. "The Holocaust simply isn't taught," Herz observed. Another Chinese, he added, simply dismissed anti-Semitic political massacres: "Well, isn't that a small price for getting the country back on its feet?"

So while Hitler never succeeded in building his *Welthauptstadt*, the Chinese, searching the world for role models, might naturally gravitate toward a fellow totalitarian with a

Ah, but weren't China and the U.S. on the same side against Japan? Yes and no. The American government sided with Chiang Kai-shek in the '40s, and when Chiang fled to Taiwan in 1949, the U.S. recognized Taiwan as the Republic of China, breaking off relations with Chairman Mao in Beijing. Then, to make matters worse, the U.S. and Red China went to war in Korea in 1950. Nearly 33,700 Americans died in that conflict—and almost a million Chinese. Americans have mostly forgotten the Korean War, but the huge losses on China's side, suffered on a warfront adjacent to the Chinese homeland, make for some lingering hard feelings. Those hard feelings, however well masked, help explain why the Chinese are so uninterested in corralling North Korea and its nuclear program.

But of course, the big enchilada, to mix an ethnic metaphor, is Taiwan. The U.S. didn't recognize the People's Republic of China—and de-recognize Taiwan—until 1979. Even today, America stands as Taiwan's chief ally, patron, and protector. And for all of China's enthusiasm for enrichment, the political

TO THE CHINESE, WHAT WE CALL WORLD WAR II WAS **JUST ANOTHER 20TH-CENTURY EUROPEAN WAR**. AND AS FOR THE NAZIS, THEY WERE **JUST ANOTHER BUNCH OF WARRIOR WHITE PEOPLE**.

grandiose and bombastic architectural vision. And if Hitler's favorite builder, Albert Speer, who died in 1981, is not available, why not get his son?

To the Chinese, what we call World War II was just another 20th-century European war. And as for the Nazis, they were just another bunch of warrior white people—with more style than most. Yet the Chinese had their own World War II, of course, in which as many as 15 million died.

class in China—perhaps because the Communists need something to justify their rule now that they don't micromanage the economy anymore—is keeping a steady drumbeat on the Taiwan "reunification" issue.

Indeed, the recent decision by Japan to side with the U.S. on Taiwan sent shockwaves here. Japan is China's arch-enemy; the Japanese invaded the Middle Kingdom in the '30s, killing many millions—and have never apologized, at

least not to the satisfaction of the Chinese. So the headline in the March 7 edition of *China Daily*, a government publication, was blunt: "Lay off Taiwan, U.S. and Japan told." In the words of foreign minister Li Zhaoxing, "The Taiwan question is China's internal affair and should by no means be deliberated in the framework of the security alliance between the United States and Japan."

The Chinese may be nationalists, and they may even be, in a fashion, socialists, but it's worth emphasizing that, appearances notwithstanding, they aren't Nazis. They barely know who the Hitlerites were, just as few Americans know the difference between the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer Rebellion.

And how do the Chinese feel about Americans in general? Gloria Zhang, a pollster for Horizon China, the country's

leading survey firm, told me that the Chinese people like America well enough, but added, "They don't like Bush."

So one question is whether or not the Chinese people's anti-Bush feelings will bleed into a general anti-Americanism. In the words of Charles Martin, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, whom I interviewed in

country, for example, has any intention of signing on to the International Criminal Court or the Kyoto global-warming treaty. And of course, the two countries are enormous trans-Pacific trading and investing partners.

But the truth remains: on a slew of strategic questions, from nuclearized North Korea to rearmed Japan to inde-

## THE TRUTH REMAINS: ON A SLEW OF STRATEGIC QUESTIONS, FROM NUCLEARIZED NORTH KOREA TO REARMED JAPAN TO INDEPENDENCE-MINDED TAIWAN, WASHINGTON AND BEIJING SEE THE WORLD IN STARKLY DIVERGING TERMS.

Beijing, "There's definitely an undercurrent sense among many Chinese that the U.S. doesn't want China to be a world power." And of course, Martin added, "There are plenty of Americans who don't want China to be a great power."

Seen from that realist perspective, the U.S.-China relationship is just another great-power rivalry. Different countries have different interests. Yet some Americans, to be sure, coming from a more ideological neoconservative perspective, might not be so pragmatic, arguing that China's record of internal oppression and external aggression justifies a strong, even forceful, response from the U.S.

But that's the point: all through history, nations and empires have coexisted, collided, and frequently fought—sometimes with good reason. But it's worth noting again that the political or economic systems of the combatant countries are generally less important than the fact that the countries wanted the same things—ranging from territory to resources to pecking-order status. Which is to say, even if China were to become a genuine democracy, it would still be vying with the U.S. for its place in the sun.

On some issues, to be sure, the U.S.A. and the PRC see eye to eye. Neither

pendence-minded Taiwan, Washington and Beijing see the world in starkly diverging terms. Norman Angell was right in pointing out the costly folly of fighting, but as the 20th century proved, nations sometimes go to war anyway, because they have to. And as the last century also proved, sometimes they go to war because they want to. Thus the great challenge of the coming century is to make sure that those stark divergences don't turn into an even starker warfare—assuming, of course, that both countries wish to avoid war.

As I watched those goose-stepping soldiers in Tiananmen—and as I thought about the blustering, jingoizing, mandatory world-improving utopians back home in the U.S.—I wondered if Norman Angell's lesson about the disastrous cost of war was going to be neglected yet again. Indeed, I wondered if the presumption that both Pacific powers want peace was just another great illusion. ■

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[Margaret Sanger's logic]

# Pre-emptive Executions?

The notion that legalizing abortion drives down crime rates is logically flawed and morally repugnant.

By Steve Sailer

DID LEGALIZING ABORTION in the early '70s reduce crime in the late '90s by allowing "pre-emptive capital punishment" of potential troublemakers? Or did the Supreme Court's 1973 *Roe v. Wade* decision, by outmoding shotgun weddings, adoption, and respect for life, instead make more murderous the early '90s crack wars fought by the first generation of youths to survive legalized abortion?

Since 1999, the University of Chicago economist Steven D. Levitt has been pushing his theory that legal abortion is responsible for half of the recent fall in crime. This assertion is the most prominent element in *Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything*, the entertaining new book Levitt co-wrote with journalist Stephen J. Dubner.

Despite his claim to be a "rogue economist" (and his excruciating taste in book titles), Levitt is much admired within his profession. In 2003, the American Economics Association awarded him, at the unusually early age of 35, its biennial John Bates Clark medal as the outstanding economist under 40.

The theory that legalizing abortion cuts crime is hardly original to Levitt, but it has long been more whispered than printed. Levitt's hypothesis embarrasses pro-choicers, who don't want public discussion of how quite a few people, from

crusading eugenicist and Planned Parenthood founder Margaret Sanger onward, have backed fertility control as a way to limit "undesirables." Since blacks undergo about three times as many abortions as whites per capita, white liberals realize that endorsing Levitt's reasoning could be politically disastrous.

Levitt's idea also outrages pro-lifers, who note that King Herod used similar logic in ordering the slaughter of thousands of babies to try to eliminate the threat posed by the infant Jesus.

That doesn't mean the argument is false. As a social scientist, Levitt has an obligation to follow the data wherever they may lead him. But that doesn't mean it's true, either.

Levitt's theory rests on two plausible-sounding statements. First, he claims that abortion lowers the number of

which young men enter their criminal prime—the rate of crime began to fall. What this cohort was missing, of course, were the children who stood the greatest chance of becoming criminals."

Although Levitt's research has been praised by normally hardheaded gentlemen such as George Will and Robert Samuelson, few have probed its statistical complexities. Overall crime-trend data are frequently questionable. For example, the city of Atlanta long understated crime to attract the 1996 Olympics. The FBI's homicide statistics, however, are more trustworthy because, as Arthur Miller might have said, attention must be paid to a dead body with a hole in it.

According to Levitt's logic, murder should have declined first among the youngest and last among the oldest. Did it? Unfortunately for Levitt, the opposite

**SINCE BLACKS UNDERGO ABOUT THREE TIMES AS MANY ABORTIONS AS WHITES, WHITE LIBERALS REALIZE THAT ENDORSING LEVITT'S REASONING COULD BE POLITICALLY DISASTROUS.**

"unwanted" babies, who would be more likely to commit crimes someday. Second, crime did fall. Levitt writes, "In the early 1990s, just as the first cohort of children born after *Roe v. Wade* was hitting its late teen years—the years during

is true. The murder rate for Americans age 25 and over started falling way back in 1981 (when the youngest person in this cohort was born in 1956) and fell fairly steadily for two decades. Indeed, in contrast to his theory about post-*Roe*

individuals being especially law-abiding, the adult murder rate has only begun to creep back up now that people born after *Roe* have begun to make up a noticeable fraction of those 25 and up. From 1999 through 2002 (the latest year available, when a 25-year-old would have been born four years after *Roe*), the murder rate among 25- to 34-year-olds has risen 17 percent, while continuing to drop among the under-25s.

But the acid test of Levitt's theory is this: did the first New, Improved Generation culled by legalized abortion actually grow up to be more lawful teenagers than the last generation born before legalization? Hardly. Instead, the first cohort to survive legalized abortion went on the worst youth murder spree in American history.

Abortion became legal in 1970 in California, New York, and three smaller states. Let's compare the murder rate of 14- to 17-year-olds in 1983 (who were born in the last pre-legalization years of 1965-1969) with that of 14- to 17-year-olds a decade later in 1993 (who were born in the high-abortion years of 1975-1979). Was this post-*Roe* cohort better behaved than their pre-legalization elders? Not exactly. Their murder rate was 3.1 times worse.

In contrast, 18- to 24-year-olds in 1993—some born before legalization, some after—committed 86 percent more murders than a decade earlier, while people 25 and up—all born before legalization—were 18 percent less lethal. Back in 1983, 14- to 17-year-olds were barely more than half as likely as 25- to 34-year-olds to kill. In 1993 and 1994, however, this purportedly better-bred generation of juveniles was more than twice as deadly as 25- to 34-year-olds.

## LEVITT LOOKED AT CRIME RATES IN 1985 AND 1997 AND PAID LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE VAST CRACK EPIDEMIC THAT LAID WASTE TO URBAN AMERICA IN BETWEEN.

Although Levitt desperately wants to avoid talking about race in relation to abortion and crime, blacks make an ideal test case for his theory because, as Levitt himself has noted, black women have about triple the number of abortions per capita as white women. So Levitt's theory suggests that black teens should have "benefited" more than whites from abortion. Instead, black 14- to 17-year-olds were an apocalyptic 4.4 times more murderous in 1993 than a decade earlier. The black-white teen murder

ratio grew from five times worse in 1983 to 11 times worse in 1993, according to the FBI.

The embarrassing truth, as Levitt admitted to me when I debated him on Slate.com in 1999, is that when he dreamed up his theory with John J. Donohue, he looked at crime rates in 1985 and 1997 and paid little attention to the vast crack epidemic that laid waste to urban America in between.


It makes no sense to credit abortion for any subsequent improvement in the

behavior of the first post-*Roe* generation, when abortion so dismally failed to keep them on the straight and narrow when they were juveniles. Instead, the most obvious explanation for the ups and downs of the murder rate is the ups and downs of the crack business.

This generation born right after legalization is better behaved today in part because so many of its bad apples are now confined to prisons, wheelchairs, and coffins. About two million people are now in jail, four times more than in 1972. (Levitt attributes roughly one-third of the recent fall in crime to increased incarceration.)

The leaders in the decline in murder in the later 1990s were black male 14- to 17-year-olds, who by 1998 were killing at less than one-third the rate of their older brothers just five years earlier. These African-American kids born in the early '80s survived abortion levels similar to those faced by the crime-ridden 1975-79 generation, but seeing their big brothers gunned down in drive-by shootings may have scared them straight.

I believe Levitt when he says he has no political axe to grind about abortion—but he does have a bit of an ego




about his ideas. To find a justification for his naïve initial hypothesis, he has been stubbornly straining his formidable cleverness. (Although in *Freakonomics* he employed the simplest way to deal with these objections: he ignored them completely.)

For example, he argues that crime fell first in the five states that legalized abortion back in 1970. Okay, but isn't it at least as interesting that crime had previously gone up first in those early legalizing states? And hardly surprising it then burned out there first?

Indeed, there is at least as much evidence that legalizing abortion increased homicide. As Levitt acknowledged to me in 1999, "[T]he high abortion places like New York and California tended to have a bigger crack problem, and tended to have crack arrive earlier." In other words, the two big urban areas that were the first to enjoy the purported crime-fighting benefits of legalized abortion in 1970, New York City and Los Angeles, were also the ground zeroes of the teen murder rampage that began, perhaps not coincidentally, about 16 years later. From NYC and LA, gangsta rap (such as NWA's landmark 1988 album "Straight Outta Compton," featuring "F\*\*\* Tha Police") glamorously spread the crack-dealer's credo to the hinterlands.

The liberal politics and permissive social attitudes that made legal abortion popular in New York, California, and Washington, D.C. (where it was *de facto* legal before *Roe*) likely also contributed to the crack epidemic. D.C., for example, enjoyed both the highest abortion rate in the U.S. and, in later years, a popular mayor, Marion Barry, who was himself a crackhead.

Still, the social effects of abortion demand closer study. Although Levitt claims that legalized abortion should have improved the conditions under which children were raised, it made adoption



rare. The federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported, "Before 1973 about one in five premarital births to white women were relinquished for adoption. By the mid-1980's (1982-88), this proportion fell to 1 in 30."

Even worse, the national illegitimacy rate soared, from 12 percent in 1972 to 34 percent in 2002. The growth didn't begin to slow until the mid-1990s, when the abortion rate declined. Increased illegitimacy is socially devastating, not just because of the long-run harm to the child of being raised without a father but because of the immediate effect of freeing young men from the civilizing clutches of marriage.

Why did the abortion rate and the illegitimacy rate both skyrocket during the '70s? Isn't abortion supposed to cut illegitimacy? *Roe* largely finished off the traditional shotgun wedding by persuading the impregnating boyfriend that he had no moral duty to make an honest woman of his girlfriend since she could get an abortion. The CDC noted, "Among women aged 15-29 years conceiving a first birth before marriage during 1970-74, nearly half (49 percent) married before the child was born. By 1975-79 the proportion marrying before the birth of the child fell to 32 percent,

and it has declined to 23 percent in 1990-94."

The most striking fact about legalized abortion, but also the least discussed, is its pointlessness. Levitt himself notes that following *Roe*, "Conceptions rose by nearly 30 percent, but births actually fell by 6 percent ..." So for every six fetuses aborted in the 1970s, five would never have been conceived except for *Roe*! This ratio makes a sick joke out of Levitt's assumption that legalization made a significant difference in how "wanted" children were. Indeed, perhaps the increase in the number of women who got pregnant figuring they would get an abortion but then were too drunk or drugged or distracted to get to the clinic has meant that the "wantedness" of surviving babies has declined.

The sheer waste of it all is staggering. And the impact on the overall morality of our society of this Supreme Court-condoned carelessness over life is incalculable. ■

Steve Sailer is TAC's film critic and VDARE.com's Monday morning columnist. Graphs illustrating this article are posted at [www.isteve.com/abortion.htm](http://www.isteve.com/abortion.htm).

# The Taxman Cometh

Republicans contemplate breaking their pledge.

By W. James Antle III

POLITICIANS WHO TALK about raising taxes are guaranteed to elicit a backlash. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) has discovered he is no exception to this rule. His idea of funding Social Security reform in part by applying payroll taxes to higher income levels has made him the target of a television ad campaign by the Club for Growth, a potent anti-tax political action committee.

The ad is as tough as it would be if it were aimed at Michael Dukakis. It characterizes Graham's proposal as a "huge tax hike" that would "hit millions of families, wipe out much of the Bush tax cut, and punish small businesses." The announcer concludes by taunting, "Hey Lindsey: You can't help someone save for retirement by raising their taxes." The press release announcing the launch of this campaign quotes a local Republican politician and Club for Growth member as saying, "I would expect a proposal like this from Hillary Clinton, not from a conservative Senator from South Carolina."

The tax revolt was sparked by a seemingly arcane attempt to break the Social Security reform stalemate. Right now only the first \$90,000 of a worker's wages are subject to the 12.4 percent payroll tax. Graham would cut the payroll-tax rate but raise the level of income taxed. The end result would be a net tax increase for some taxpayers.

As is often the case when Republican politicians run afoul of movement conservatives, bipartisanship was the objective. A Social Security bill is unlikely to pass the Senate without the support of

at least five Democrats, who have so far been reluctant to hand George W. Bush a major second-term legislative victory. Graham hoped that by combining personal investment accounts with a higher payroll-tax cap, he might be able to induce a few senators to break ranks. Instead the idea seems to have divided the free-market coalition backing reform and called into question the GOP's commitment to low taxes.

At the outset of the Social Security debate, many conservatives who viewed personal accounts as especially desirable seemed resigned to the possibility that a tax compromise might be necessary to get Congress to pass them. Robert Novak speculated in his syndicated column that perhaps partial privatization "cannot be done without swallowing a lot that is distasteful for conservatives, but it may be worth it." Writing in *National Review*, Ramesh Ponnuru warned, "Whatever emerges from Congress, if anything does, will include provisions that conservatives do not like: perhaps an increase in the progressivity of the payroll tax, or something worse."

Yet when Graham first floated the idea of raising the payroll-tax cap late last year, he was roundly condemned for "negotiating with himself." Criticism of the proposal took on a new urgency in February when President Bush seemed to put the cap on the table, telling a reporter that while he was unwilling to accept an increase in payroll-tax rates, everything else was negotiable, leaving room for higher income levels to be hit with those rates. Novak then reported

that "some Republicans who denounced Graham three months ago have moved closer to him."

Many prominent economic conservatives have jumped into the fray to arrest any such movement. "We don't want this idea to gain any currency," says Club for Growth executive director David Keating. "It's politically and economically poisonous."

Voting for a tax increase is especially politically risky for Republicans, since most of them explicitly promised not to do so during their campaigns. President Bush, 46 senators, and 222 House members have taken Americans for Tax Reform's pledge not to increase marginal tax rates. The organization's president, Grover Norquist, calls Graham's proposal "a betrayal of the taxpayer protection pledge."

A few conservatives dissent from this assessment. The pledge allows legislators to vote to eliminate deductions and credits provided that they are matched with offsetting dollar-for-dollar tax cuts elsewhere. Perhaps the right combination of lower payroll-tax rates and generous personal accounts—which, they argue, are essentially payroll-tax cuts themselves—might be compatible with a pledge not to boost marginal rates. Anti-tax activists counter that nothing with such mitigating factors has been proposed.

But a higher payroll-tax cap is not without some influential supporters on the Right. Syndicated columnist George Will, never one to be "taxophobic," chided Republicans piling on Graham to "grow up." A tax increase that might win



free-market reform of a major entitlement program, he argued, “hardly blurs the distinction between conservatism and Bolshevism.” In fact, by reducing the amount of borrowing necessary for the transition to personal accounts, it might deprive Democrats of one of their most politically powerful objections to reform.

“I like George Will and he’s a great writer,” says Norquist. “But he has the politics of this exactly backwards.” A tax compromise would “completely undercut” the free-market position on Social Security rather than help it.

“It’s hard to see how weighing down Social Security reform with a tax increase will make it more popular,” argues Keating. “When most people hear the words ‘tax increase,’ their antennas go up and they ask, ‘Whoa, what are these politicians up to?’”

Norquist offers a challenge to payroll-tax cap-raisers. “Show me one D that has actually moved over to the other side because of this proposal,” he says. “Not people who are willing to talk about it, someone who actually has come out in favor of personal accounts.” The veteran tax reformer contends such Democrats are nonexistent, with one exception. The Democratic leadership, he says, “is no doubt pleased as Punch by this.” In fact, Norquist fears it will be even more difficult to win Democratic support now that some Republicans are showing flexibility on tax hikes.

The fight over the payroll-tax cap comes at a time of uncertainty for the GOP’s anti-tax image. In March, the *Washington Post* reported that tax cuts have been downgraded on the party’s agenda. White House aides were quoted as saying the objective of any tax-reform bill sought by the administration would be to simplify the code, not to lower marginal rates. Leading House conservatives, such as Congressman Mike Pence (R-Ind.) of the Republican Study Committee, moved quickly to quell the per-

A just completed two-week visit to the Persian Gulf and Turkey reveals that United States foreign policy is truly broken in the Muslim world, but the good news is that while the dislike of America is both broad and deep, the situation is not beyond repair. Elites in the Gulf States and in countries like Turkey continue to identify strongly with the United States, in spite of what they see as persistent American insensitivity and repeated betrayals of principle over the past three years. Arabs and Turks object particularly to the tone of the United States’ assertion of democracy for the region, noting that the American track record is very bad whenever it is called upon to support genuine reform and that the attitude is ultimately patronizing, particularly when senior U.S. officials offer to “help” the locals in their quest for political freedom. Most people in the Middle East support consigning the autocratic rule and anti-democratic practices that characterize the region to the dustbin of history. What they object to is a suspect American administration seeking to guide the process.

The grievances against the United States are legion, ranging from the difficulty in obtaining visas for Arab students to study in America to failures to communicate with allies as equals. As one senior Turkish diplomat put it, “The Bush administration had to work very hard to alienate its close ally Turkey, but it did so when it did not treat us respectfully.” Once hitherto pro-American attitudes had shifted, the U.S. was reflexively blamed by elites and the public alike for everything going wrong in the region. But the people of the Middle East continue to like Americans individually in spite of their differences with U.S. government policy as they perceive it. It is the policy that is the problem.

Arabs and Turks, ranging from the man on the street to senior government officials and businessmen, stated that they expect little from the United States and noted ruefully they usually get what they expect. They are, however, watching carefully to see if, this time around, the Bush administration means what it says. They identify two issues as central to the introduction of popular rule in the Arab world. The issue cited most frequently was not, surprisingly, the Israel-Palestine conflict. It was Egypt. Arabs know that as Egypt goes, so goes every other Arab state. If the United States is able to pressure its ally Hosni Mubarak to hold elections that could end his own autocratic rule, it would be seen as a pivotal historic event that would elevate the United States in the eyes of most Arabs and might genuinely transform the region. Palestine is, of course, the second issue. The ability of the United States to force Israel to leave the West Bank and bring about the creation of a genuinely viable Palestinian state is undoubted. The will to do so is widely perceived as lacking. An America prepared to address the disparate issues of Palestine and Egypt could produce a political tsunami that would, *inter alia*, eliminate many of the root causes of Islamic terrorism.

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ception of mixed signals on tax cuts. But key Senate Republicans are voicing opposition to making all of the Bush tax cuts permanent, and it is possible that at least some of the cuts will be allowed to expire despite unified GOP control of the presidency and both houses of Congress.

Over the years, as Republicans have grown slacker on spending, they have moved to the right on taxes. It is often forgotten that Ronald Reagan was a convert to the supply-side faith. As governor of California, he signed on to tax increases of a magnitude that would be inconceivable for any serious conservative presidential aspirant today. Even in the White

But the incongruity between high spending and low taxes has been slowly catching up to the national GOP. Republican leaders have over time used many different arguments in their attempts to square this circle. During the 1980s, Jack Kemp and other supply-siders maintained that lower tax rates were compatible with a tax base large enough to fund the welfare state the American people had become enamored of in the years following the New Deal. Cutting confiscatory tax rates would reduce tax evasion and avoidance, increasing the amount of income reported, and accelerate economic growth, increasing the amount of

One problem with this approach is that it has always reinforced the liberal argument that tax cuts are somehow unaffordable. It also has the unfortunate result of making the party of fiscal responsibility seem, well, irresponsible. What swing voter wants to cast a ballot for deliberately failing to raise enough money to finance the federal government?

But the largest problem for starve-the-beast Republicans is that, at least at the federal level, budget politics seldom work out their way in practice. When neither party wants to cut spending and only one is interested in holding the line on taxes, whenever the deficit becomes a salient issue it has generally been the anti-tax forces who have lost. The major tax increases of the '80s and '90s were all driven by concern over the deficit. It is difficult to trace any long-term retrenchment of the federal government to those concerns, although arguably deficit spending has complicated the prospects for new large-scale programs.

Signs are already emerging that renewed concern about the deficit may unravel the Bush tax cuts. The swing votes in the Senate that will determine which tax cuts survive belong to moderate Republican deficit hawks—who, unlike deficit hawks of old, are usually more concerned about tax cuts than spending increases. The starve-the-beast argument only encourages these moderates.

As GOP tax timidity grows, economic conservatives will become even less likely to give any ground on taxes. "The anti-tax, pro-growth party image is an important part of the Republican branding," says Keating. "Moving away from this seems like political suicide." Any openness to tax increases, he argues, is as unsound politically as it is economically.

GOP politicians who forget they ran on a platform of holding the line on taxes have grassroots movement conservatives to remind them. ■

**"THE ANTI-TAX, PRO-GROWTH PARTY IMAGE IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE REPUBLICAN BRANDING," SAYS KEATING. "MOVING AWAY FROM THIS SEEMS LIKE POLITICAL SUICIDE."**

House, he accepted some deficit-reduction tax hikes and the reversal of some of his landmark tax cuts.

As late as 1990, when the elder George Bush signed the promise-breaking tax increase that irreparably damaged his relationship with the GOP's grassroots activists, he was able to count on the support of such stalwart conservatives as then Sen. Phil Gramm (R-Texas). By 1993, even the most liberal Republicans in Congress voted against the Clinton tax increase. Since then, whatever the economic or budgetary conditions, the party leadership has consistently pushed to cut taxes rather than raise them.

Promises like the taxpayer protection pledge are now a critical part of Republican campaign platforms at every level of government. Since 1988, every GOP presidential nominee has taken the pledge. Tax-cutters are an important and enthusiastic component of the party's base, and low taxes are often taken for granted as a reason to vote Republican.

income earned. Lower tax rates applied to a larger tax base would therefore avoid the need to resort to the "root-canal politics" of unpopular budget cuts.

That argument had some validity when marginal income-tax rates reached as high as 70 percent and inflation-induced bracket creep was constantly imposing unlegislated tax increases on middle-class families. But today, the top statutory marginal tax rate is 35 percent, higher than at the end of the Reagan years but too low to offer much of a Laffer-curve effect of increased revenues when cut.

More recently, Republicans have gone back to their cocktail napkins and advanced a new argument: since direct assaults on federal spending tend to produce an electoral backlash, the best way to shrink government is by "starving the beast." Under this scenario, politicians will be forced to cut expenditures as tax cuts deprive Washington of the revenue needed to fund them.

# Arts & Letters

## FILM

[*Walk on Water*]

### The One About the Mossad and the Gay German

By Steve Sailer

THE ENTERTAINING Israeli comedy-drama “Walk on Water”—in which a macho Mossad assassin must ingratiate himself with a gay German tourist to ferret out the whereabouts of his almost 100-year-old ex-Nazi grandfather and kill him—paradoxically calls to mind the remarkably small impact Israelis have on popular culture.

Although Israel is always in the headlines, Israelis almost never make news in the entertainment pages. The country is so short on globally recognized celebrities that Israelis sometimes brag to foreigners that Gene Simmons, the lizard-tongued bass player for ’70s trash-rock band Kiss, lived in Haifa from 1949 to 1958.

The paltry performance of Israel’s five million Jews in the celebrity industry in which their six million American cousins do so well partly reflects the limitations of speaking a unique national language, although many Israelis speak other tongues as well. “Walk on Water,” for example, is mostly in English because the Mossad agent hides his ability to speak German, which he learned from his concentration camp survivor mother, so he can eavesdrop on the German’s conversations with his family.

More fundamentally, as Berkeley historian Yuri Slezkine detailed in his bril-

liant 2004 book *The Jewish Century*, the founding Zionists always intended the Jewish state to be as un-Jewish in jobs as possible. While the modern economy has slowly made the rest of the world more like Jews—“urban, mobile, literate, articulate, intellectually intricate, physically fastidious, and occupationally flexible,” in Slezkine’s words—the early Israelis strove to become more like the warriors and farmers who then predominated among other peoples.

These days, though, filmmaking expertise is so widespread that competently made movies can come from anywhere, even Israel. The key requirement is an interesting script, which is more likely to be found in a low-budget import than in a Hollywood movie, where the typical nine-figure investment in production and marketing requires a screenplay dumbed down to the globalist common denominator.

“Walk on Water” is powered by Israeli actor Lior Ashkenazi’s star-making performance as the callous hitman. In a compelling opening scene in Istanbul, where he poisons a Hamas leader vacationing with his family, Ashkenazi displays the same cold charisma that his near-double, American actor Liev Schreiber, delivered in the spy movies “The Sum of All Fears” and “The Manchurian Candidate.”

When he returns to Tel Aviv and finds that his beautiful wife has killed herself, he reacts so stoically that his worried bosses give him a frustratingly cushy assignment. He must go undercover as a tour guide showing a naïve young German around the Sea of Galilee so he can find out where in Argentina the visitor’s grandfather has been holed up for the last 60 years.

While the American media treat Nazi-hunting as a self-evidently essential task, the Mossad agent sees tracking a nonagenarian Nazi as a waste of time when he

could be killing Arabs instead. Moreover, his German client, a gangly, goofy, good-hearted boy-man—a less handsome Ashton Kutcher or an unathletic Bill Walton—drives the cynical Sabra nuts.

There’s also an amusing altercation with an Arab shopkeeper that hints at the trouble multiculturalism generates as Israelis, who might be the brusquest people on earth, rub up against etiquette-revering Arabs, who assume any rudeness is an intentional insult that honor demands must be avenged.

Unfortunately, director Eytan Fox and screenwriter Gal Uchovsky indulge in the usual insincerities of out-of-the-closet gay filmmakers. Isn’t it odd that male homosexuals in the movie business were often more honest in the past when they had to sublimate their sexuality?

Although they claim their movie critiques Israel’s tradition of machismo, they are obviously infatuated with their Hebrew-speaking he-man.

Moreover, as is common among politicized homosexual filmmakers worried about “validating stereotypes,” they’ve stripped their gay character of all gay characteristics. This sloppily dressed, shambling quasi-hippie would not set off anybody’s gaydar.

Finally, making the German a putative homosexual leeches the intended irony from the movie. The point of “Walk on Water” is supposed to be the Israeli’s eventual realization that the German, despite being the grandson of a mass murderer, is a better human being than he, who uses his ancestors’ victimization to justify his homicides. But if the German really is gay, then the motivation for his kindness toward the madly attractive Mossad man appears less than pure-hearted. “Walk on Water” would have worked better as a conventional odd-couple buddy movie. ■

Unrated, but would be a soft R.

## BOOKS

[*Against Leviathan: Government Power and a Free Society*, Robert Higgs, Independent Institute, 408 pages]

## Enemy of the State

By Daniel McCarthy

EIGHTEEN YEARS AGO, Robert Higgs published *Crisis and Leviathan*, a work that has since become a landmark in the study of political economy. Upon its release, the book attracted favorable reviews from nearly every quarter, with a *Harper's* editor calling it "a thoughtful and challenging work" and the *American Spectator's* R. Emmett Tyrrell writing, with characteristic hyperbole, that he could "think of no more important reading than Mr. Higgs' book, apart from the Constitution itself." Economists from Murray Rothbard to James Buchanan similarly praised it.

What made *Crisis and Leviathan* a milestone was the rigor with which it elaborated upon the logic of James Madison's 1794 warning against "the old trick of turning every contingency into a resource for accumulating force in government." Other political economists had studied the growth of state power during times of war, depression, and general upheaval before, but none had done so as thoughtfully and thoroughly as Higgs. He took special care in describing the "ratchet effect"—once a crisis has passed state power usually recedes again, but it rarely returns to its original levels; thus each emergency leaves the scope of government at least a little wider than before. Just as importantly, Higgs paid close attention to the role of ideology in nourishing Leviathan, a factor often dismissed out of hand by economists for whom what cannot be quantified does not exist.

Higgs is an economist of a different kind, as his new book, *Against Leviathan*, shows. His background is well within the scholarly mainstream—a Johns Hopkins Ph.D., he has taught at colleges large and small, from the University of Washington to Pennsylvania's Lafayette College, where he held the William E. Simon chair in political economy before joining the Independent Institute of Oakland, California and becoming the editor of its quarterly journal, the *Independent Review*. But he has long questioned the assumptions, and the numbers, on which the pillars of political economy rest. Against the public-choice school, with whom he otherwise has much in common, Higgs contends that government cannot simply be treated as if it were a business or a means for reducing the "transaction costs" of contracts—force and ideology play too great a role. This new volume, carrying on from *Crisis and Leviathan*, makes that case powerfully.

The 40 short chapters here are drawn from Higgs's journalism in the *Independent Review* and elsewhere; yet despite the variety of sources, this volume comes close to being an organic whole. It is a polemic, as the title suggests, but one built upon meticulous scholarship. "Although I express a definite point of view in these essays," Higgs writes in his introduction, "I have also been at pains to present evidence, explanation, and analysis—this book is not just a bunch of op-ed diatribes." What's more, "I have sought to express my ideas in clear, forceful, and vivid English"—for which the reader can be grateful. Political economy hardly makes for a sexy subject matter even with the lucid prose, cutting wit, and moral intensity Higgs brings to this book; without those qualities, all else would be lost.

That Higgs sets out in his first chapter to overturn the Left's most sacred idol helps enliven things immediately. That opening volley is entitled, provocatively, "Is More Economic Equality Better?" One need not be a Marxist to think so: too wide a gulf between the riches of the elite and the meager lot of the poor

promises to be a recipe for turmoil. But Higgs cannily approaches the question from an oblique angle, showing that inequality can have structural causes that no sensible person would want to remove. By way of illustration he suggests, tongue in cheek, seven radical measures that could drastically reduce income inequality—compelling housewives to enter the workforce, for example. "Because housewives are not rewarded for their efforts in the home by explicit monetary payments, their presence in society increases economic inequality—at least as now measured." Higgs here lampoons those sophisters and calculators whose statistics paint an unworldly picture of human misery. Statistical inequality need not mean societal instability; what must be examined, Higgs argues, is whether the actions that lead to more or less equal distribution of wealth are themselves just or not.

Two further chapters explore the ethos and practice of income redistribution in detail before the author turns his attention to the men who built the welfare state, whom he calls in his next section heading, "Our Glorious Leaders." These include a few of the usual bogeymen execrated by critics of big government, notably Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Richard Nixon. But Higgs does not conjure their ghosts simply to condemn them again (and again and again); he has a new take. The chapter on Nixon, for example, does not dwell on his price controls or Watergate or even that part of the Vietnam conflict fought during his tenure. Instead, Nixon represents for Higgs a common type—not a monster but a politician who keenly understood the ways of patronage and power and whose example teaches us a great deal about the nature of the trade. That nature, according to Higgs, was adumbrated long before Nixon by the words of Lord Bolingbroke, who wrote of his own political fortunes, "we came to court in the same dispositions that all parties have done ... our principal views were the conservation of [governmental] power, great employments to our-



selves, and great opportunities of rewarding those who had helped to raise us, and of hurting those who stood in opposition to us.”

That may be a depressing thought, but Higgs is not all twilight and gloom. In later pages he revisits American history in search of a few good—not great—presidents, and he finds some. Best of all in his view is Grover Cleveland. “He kept the country at peace. He respected the Constitution, acknowledging that the national government has only a limited mission to perform and shaping his policies accordingly.” Indeed, Cleveland took the legal limits of his ability to act so seriously that he refused to offer federal disaster relief to drought-stricken Texas farmers; he simply could not find any constitutional authority for doing so. Other presidents who fare well by Higgs’s standards include one of the greats, George Washington, and if not Ronald Reagan at least Reagan’s own favorite occupant of the Oval Office, Calvin Coolidge. Higgs seconds Henry Mencken’s wry epitaph for Silent Cal: “There were no thrills while he reigned, but neither were there any headaches. He had no ideas, and he was not a nuisance.” All of this supplies a welcome antidote to the war-president hagiographies offered by the likes of Michael Beschloss and Doris Kearns Goodwin (or whoever writes her books).

These early chapters fortify the reader for the intense examination of economic policy that follows and comprises the bulk of the book. On everything from taxation, trade, and regulation to the therapeutic regime that urges Ritalin on every fidgety schoolboy, this book presents an uncompromising and carefully argued case for smaller government. Even many conservatives and libertarians sympathetic to the direction of Higgs’s thought may find him too radical at times; not for nothing does he begin the book with an epigraph from Burke’s *Vindication of Natural Society*—“In vain you tell me that artificial government is good, but that I fall out only with the abuse. The thing! The thing itself is the abuse!”—a work the states-

man himself published anonymously and later repudiated as a mere satire. Since *Crisis and Leviathan*, Higgs has become ever more trenchant in his criticisms, and he does not offer policy-makers palatable—or some might say plausible—alternatives to their current practices. Yet this negative effort is still an invaluable service, all the more so because he is not averse to addressing such impolitic topics as wasteful military spending and the failings of the Food and Drug Administration.

What can he say about the FDA, an agency that keeps us safe from impure food and poisonous pharmaceuticals? Occasionally the FDA will approve a drug like Vioxx that later turns out to be harmful, but the larger problem with the agency, he contends, is to be found in the other direction—in the form of life-saving medicines that have been held up by the regulatory process or kept off the market altogether by the rigors of bureaucracy. The depth of this problem can be gauged by noting how often doctors prescribe medications for “off label” purposes—that is, for uses not approved by the FDA. The figures Higgs cites indicate that 40 to 50 percent of all prescriptions, and a higher percentage of those for children and cancer patients, are for “off label” uses.

**HIGGS SECONDS HENRY MENCKEN’S WRY EPITAPH FOR SILENT CAL: “THERE WERE NO THRILLS WHILE HE REIGNED, BUT NEITHER WERE THERE ANY HEADACHES.”**

A cold anger suffuses the chapters here on the political abuses of defense contracts. When congressmen approve useless or defective weapons systems for the sake of their own re-election prospects, they jeopardize the whole country. Higgs mints a new word for these reckless pols: pork-hawks. He relates at length the stories of such early 1980s defense boondoggles as the A-7 and T-46 aircraft, the latter of which cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars and ultimately produced “only two prototypes and a single production-model aircraft.” Every million for planes

that don’t fly is, of course, another million that cannot go toward providing U.S. soldiers in a combat zone with proper armor. Or as Higgs puts it, this kind of corruption “slashes the ammunition budget in order to buy more guns.” It won’t stop until “opinion leaders, and hence the public, start to view these acts as treachery rather than as politics as usual.” Quoting an anonymous congressional aide, Higgs notes that 9/11 changed nothing in this regard: “For Congress, this disgusted insider wrote, ‘War is not Hell; it’s an opportunity.’”

As important as such material is, much of it can be found elsewhere—albeit not so succinctly and cogently argued—in studies by the Cato Institute and other think tanks with an eye on Uncle Sam’s spending habits and urge to meddle. *Against Leviathan*’s last two sets of chapters, however, present rather more original matter—surprisingly, most of it in the form of book reviews. Higgs is often at his best engaging the work of other scholars, whether he’s sharpening his thoughts about ideology against the whetstone of Aileen Kraditor’s book *The Radical Persuasion* or debunking the reheated socialism of Third Way guru Anthony Giddens. A representative example is Higgs’s discussion of *Quicksilver Capital*, a 1991

volume by political economists Richard B. McKenzie and Dwight R. Lee. Their thesis in that work, and an idea in great vogue among libertarians throughout the tech-boom ‘90s, is that the increasing mobility of capital across national borders promises to render the Leviathan-state a thing of the past. Higgs dissents: at the height of globalization, government was not getting smaller. The statistics upon which the pollyannaish forecast of *Quicksilver Capital* is based turn out not to be reliable. The rate of government expansion slowed for a time in the last decade only because the larger the

state grew the smaller each additional billion became by comparison.

Moreover, Higgs notes, the statistics fail to take ideology into account. Economic progressivism may have lost some of its popularity since the collapse of Communism, but what has replaced it is not a new longing for limited government. Citing the evidence of opinion surveys, Higgs reveals, "During the past twenty-five years increasing proportions of the randomly sampled respondents have had no opinion at all about the size and power of the national government in the United States. They evidently view it either as a fact of nature or as beyond conceivable change. Maybe they just don't care." "Arriving at a condition against which Alexis de Tocqueville warned long ago," he later writes, "the American people have now become for the most part 'a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd.'"

Something in the American character had to change before a people who had revolted against George III's taxes on tea and sugar could accept an Internal Revenue Service—and before a nation whose statesmen had cautioned against entangling alliances and searching out monsters to destroy could become sheriff to the whole world. Higgs locates in

the Civil War "the Bloody Hinge of American History," with Union and Confederacy alike seizing vast new powers over the press, the judiciary, commerce, personal income, and even money itself—the era gave us both "Confederate currency" and the greenback. But the spirit of the Old Republic was not lost all at once; "something approximating classical liberalism retained a strong hold on most Americans, even on many opinion leaders, prior to the Progressive Era." It was only then that a combination of judicial activism and the imperial presidency of Theodore Roosevelt effected the fatal turn, as Higgs discusses in a review of Martin Sklar's book *The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916*.

The closing chapters of *Against Leviathan* leave the reader hoping that Higgs will soon return to his study of ideology at greater length. But in the meantime, this important and surprisingly readable collection provides an outstanding survey of the aggrandizement of Hobbes's artificial man. If it isn't exactly the most essential reading next to the Constitution itself, *Against Leviathan* is nonetheless the best critique of the relentless expansion of state power—and the perils that growth entails—since Higgs's own earlier book. ■

[*An Imaginative Whig: Reassessing the Life and Thought of Edmund Burke*, Ian Crowe, ed., University of Missouri Press, 242 pages]


## An Ambiguous Conservative

By Edward Feser

FOR SOME CONSERVATIVES, the value of tradition lies in its tendency to reflect an eternal order, a natural law of which tradition is but an approximation. For others, long-established practices and institutions are valuable because they provide the stability societies need for their well-being. The first sort of conservative is liable to advocate a departure from tradition if it too imperfectly reflects the natural law. The second is more likely to favor preserving tradition, even when this might entail a compromise on moral principle, in the interests of maintaining continuity with settled expectations and respect for precedent. Whereas conservatism of the first sort often rests on a robust metaphysical conception of human nature and systematic moral theory, the second type is commonly associated with skepticism about the possibility of metaphysical and moral knowledge.

Edmund Burke is interesting for many reasons, but perhaps chief among them is that he appears to straddle this divide between conservatisms. On the one hand, he clearly regarded those traditions he sought to preserve as deriving from a divine order to which we are duty bound to submit ourselves. On the other hand, he was highly suspicious of abstract theory of any sort. The essays in Ian Crowe's important new anthology reflect this tension and thereby illustrate how the conflicts that often arise among contemporary conservatives may well have their origin in the thinking of their common spiritual father.

Joseph L. Pappin III favors a reading of Burke as essentially a conservative of the metaphysical sort, and in an essay



"Same-sex marriage is nothing new.  
We've been having the same sex for 25 years."

on Burke's relationship to the Thomistic natural-law tradition he argues that, contrary to the common reading of Burke as a kind of empiricist, utilitarian, or pragmatist, he was in fact more or less in agreement with St. Thomas Aquinas concerning matters of philosophy. (Here Pappin follows Burke scholar Peter Stanlis, himself the subject of an essay in this volume by Jeffrey O. Nelson.) In defense of his interpretation, Pappin points out that Burke was hostile not so much to abstract theory *per se* but rather to skeptical conclusions in metaphysics and excessively rationalistic approaches in ethics. He also notes that Burke believed that God could be known through His works, rejected Hume's doubts about causality, and believed in natural human inclinations.

Nevertheless, it seems a stretch to conclude from all this that Burke was more or less committed to the sort of ambitious metaphysical project associated with Scholasticism. That one refuses to embrace skepticism does not entail that one has embraced Aquinas; and as Crowe indicates in his introduction to the volume, the Scottish "Common Sense School" of thought associated with Thomas Reid is more likely to have influenced Burke's thinking. In fact, there seems to be little in the philosophical views Pappin attributes to Burke that would differentiate him even from, say, John Locke, and Locke was definitely no Thomist. Locke was also not exactly a conservative, so it isn't clear that Burke's philosophical views have any essential connection to his conservatism.

F.P. Lock's account of Burke's religious views seems a likelier representation of Burke's actual philosophical position. As Lock notes, Burke's tendency was to look for the foundation of religion in psychology rather than in metaphysics—and in particular in instinctive human impulses rather than in the sort of theistic proofs favored by the medieval philosophers. He also tended to de-emphasize the importance of miracles and to doubt the reality of eternal punishment. He was, in general, latitudinarian in matters of doctrine and

stressed religion's moral and social utility over its metaphysical content. Indeed, he even seems to have been highly sympathetic to the idea that Hinduism was just as suitable a religion for the Indians as his own Anglican Christianity was for the English. (Burke's attitudes toward India and Indian culture are treated at greater length here in an essay by Frederick Whelan.) None of this is meant to imply that Burke was ultimately a skeptic: he had an unshakable belief in divine Providence and loathed atheism. But it is striking how modern—indeed, how unconservative—were his theological beliefs. As Lock notes, while Burke was certainly no deist, his "description of 'true religion' is one to which many deists could have subscribed."

If this seems to indicate that Burke's conservatism really was of the more flexible and pragmatic sort, that impression is only reinforced by David Bromwich's treatment of Burke's conception of human nature. On Bromwich's view, "Burke's philosophical idiom resembles Hume's in addressing a human nature that we know by observation and acquaintance," a methodology more beholden to the weighing of empirical and historical considerations than to classical metaphysical speculation. And while a look at Burke's famous *Reflections on the Revolution in*

current in human affairs, will appear rather to resist the decrees of Providence itself, than the mere designs of men. They will not be resolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate." If the *Reflections* present us with the classical image of Burke as the upholder of eternal truths against the purveyors of untested novelties, the Burke of the *Thoughts*, Bromwich tells us, "defers to nothing but the habits of thought that historically come to dominate a society."

At the same time, there is no denying that Burke would have had nothing but scorn for the notion that we could loose ourselves from our fundamental human obligations by writing them off as something historically contingent. Bromwich reminds us that the same Burke who penned the *Thoughts* also held that our "social ties and ligaments ... in most cases begin, and always continue, independently of our will" and that society is a partnership "not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born." Bruce Frohnen's essay on Burke and human rights offers a way of reconciling these apparently conflicting aspects of Burke. On the one hand, Burke held that all men "have a right to the fruits of their industry; and to the means of making their industry fruitful. They have a right to the acqui-

**BURKE'S TENDENCY WAS TO LOOK FOR THE FOUNDATION OF RELIGION IN PSYCHOLOGY RATHER THAN IN METAPHYSICS—AND IN PARTICULAR IN INSTINCTIVE HUMAN IMPULSES RATHER THAN IN THE SORT OF THEISTIC PROOFS FAVORED BY THE MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHERS.**

*France* might give the impression that he took the institutions he wanted to preserve to be rooted in an inflexible natural order, in his *Thoughts on French Affairs* "Burke appears to concede that all progress in society is a result of human adaptation and that the result may change the character of morality itself to the point of annulling what had once seemed permanent truths." Indeed, Burke wrote, "they, who persist in opposing this mighty

tions of their parents; to the nourishment and improvement of their offspring; to instruction in life, and to consolation in death." On the other hand, he emphasized that the manner in which these rights get their determinate content is conditioned by particular historical and cultural circumstances and that any responsible defense of these rights must be sensitive to these circumstances. Prudence rather than abstract

theory must guide the defender of human rights, and reform rather than revolution must be his program.

And yet when the *status quo* involves a defilement of institutions and norms that are absolutely essential to the order the conservative wants to conserve and a systematic violation of the most basic human rights, it can be hard to see how anything less than revolutionary change is called for. As Harvey C. Mansfield puts it in his essay on Burke's conservatism:

[T]he bias of conservatism in favor of tradition compels it to depart from the good and often leaves conservatives at a disadvantage and on the defensive. As we have seen, conservatives do not know whether in any particular case the wish to follow tradition will lead them to go back in order to recover the past or to go slow in order to maintain continuity between present and past. 'Traditional' can have either of these two opposed meanings.

Strictly speaking, these two conceptions need not be utterly opposed: one can consistently favor upholding timeless principle come what may while striving to do so in a manner that causes as little disruption as possible to existing institutions. Still, where upholding prin-

ciple might ultimately entail a very radical disruption indeed, the conservative must decide which sense of "traditional"—a return to changeless norms or deference to the *status quo*—he is going to put in the driver's seat.

In the world in which conservatives now find themselves, the need for such a decision seems more pressing every day. There will be many conservatives whose choice is to preserve the moral heritage of the West against those who would abort and euthanize the weakest members of our society. And as these conservatives come increasingly to clash with those who see in federalism and the preservation of liberal legal precedent the be-all and end-all of conservative principle, they will need to revisit Burke. They may find that for all his insight and eloquence, the father of modern conservatism is no less ambiguous than many of his spiritual children—and that it is perhaps to their spiritual grandfathers, the unambiguous and metaphysically robust thinkers of the medieval period, that conservatives should ultimately look for surer guidance in what threatens to be the darkest of Christian centuries. ■

*Edward Feser is the author of On Nozick and the forthcoming Philosophy of Mind: A Short Introduction.*

## MUSIC

### Jelly Roll & All That Jazz

By Ralph de Toledano

JAZZ, THE REAL AND RIGHTEOUS, is forever gone. Here and there a few embattled musicians attempt to give it life. And singers, most of whose talent is in their blonde hair, pretend they are Billie Holiday. "Lawdy, Lawdy, all the world's jazz crazy," Mamie Smith sang in the 1920s. But forget it. Jazz can now be found only on the CD reissues of the LP reissues of the 78 RPM shellacs, and these are being pushed off the shelf by gangsta rap and other new excrescences.

Jazz grew up almost coeval with the phonograph, so it is on those old discs that we can hear the music that emerged from the *bamboula*, the rhythmic work pats of field hands, the English four-part hymn, and the potpourri of opera and folk that swirled in New Orleans. Jazz moved up the Mississippi when Woodrow Wilson's secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, shut down Storyville's brothels and honky-tonks to protect our sailors' morals. Chicago-bound and east to Harlem, giants and innovators like Louis Armstrong and Sidney Bechet and Jelly Roll Morton, followed by a host of sidemen, passed the baton to the rest of the country. But start here with Jelly Roll Morton, who like Brahms made his professional start playing piano in a whorehouse.

It has been written of him that he never found his rightful place in the American mythology of Paul Bunyan and Johnny Appleseed as a figure who might have graced Mark Twain's pantheon of characters and scalawags. Born Ferdinand Lamothe, of a middle-class New Orleans Creole family, sometime between 1885 and 1890, he was still a boy when he began playing in the

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fancy *bagnios* of Storyville, the city's famed red-light section. By the turn of the century, he had established himself as a leading piano player and accomplished braggart. A diamond in his front tooth was his trademark.

For all his genius, music was secondary to turning a fast buck in get-rich-quick schemes. Expert pool player, pimp, card shark, nightclub manager, and fight promoter, Jelly Roll was determined to be the sharpest dresser around and to have more women on a string than anyone else in the South.

The music he made in his early years, even before he cut a series of historic records for the old Victor Company, revolutionized small-band jazz—even as Louis Armstrong's playing changed the voice, phrasing, and the attack of every

swing. You can't make crescendos and diminuendos if you're playing triple forte all the time."

New Orleans couldn't hold him, and he scammed and barnstormed through much of the South. The middle-'20s found him in Chicago, then the jazz mecca. He arrived with 20 suits and 50 pairs of shoes, the diamond twinkling in his tooth, to find signs in music shops proclaiming, "Wolverine Blue"—his composition and recording—"sold here." The Victor Company quickly signed him, and in less than three years he cut some 28 sides with New Orleans musicians.

Then it was on to New York, where his records and sheet music had already established him. Again he recorded for Victor and published his songs. (You can

FROM A **DINGY FLAT ON HARLEM'S 131ST STREET**, HE SOUGHT WORK AS "ORIGINATOR OF—JAZZ—STOMP—SWING" AND "WORLD'S GREATEST HOT TUNE WRITER," **BUT TO NO AVAIL.**

jazzman. Harmonies, rhythms, the syncope, arrangements, and the *tutti* of collective improvisation, the whole jazz genre felt Jelly Roll's influence. In his band work, some passages were written, but he—playing with musicians who sometimes could not read a score—would frequently rely on "head" arrangements in which the musical pattern was talked out.

His melodic sense was boundless, and even in those early years he was pouring out tune after tune—popularized, though they gave him no credit, by the big bands in the swing era. When Carl Sandburg heard Jelly Roll, he declared, "He's as good as George Gershwin." Ever the braggart, Jelly Roll countered, "I'm much better than Gershwin." His records—duets with King Oliver and band sides with other top Delta musicians—reached Chicago and New York, giving him a national reputation. And so did his comments on jazz, then played *fortissimo*. "It's to be played sweet, soft, with plenty rhythm, plenty

hear his complete Victor output, some 90 sides, on 5 BMG-Bluebird CDs, *The Jelly Roll Morton Centennial*.) Those were luxury days for him until the Depression hit and the bottom fell out of the music and entertainment business. By the time the swing era revived it, putting jazzmen back to work, Benny Goodman and the big bands took over with their version of jazz.

Jelly Roll Morton was considered outdated, a "moldy fig," and there was no work for him. Royalties on his records and sheet music dried out. From a dingy flat on Harlem's 131st Street, he sought work as "Originator of—JAZZ—STOMP—SWING" and "World's Greatest Hot Tune Writer," but to no avail. Moving to Washington, he worked in the grubby Jungle Inn, above a hamburger joint on U Street, where he was pianist, bartender, and chef—and was stabbed while trying to break up a brawl.

He again came to public attention in the late '30s. In a letter to *Downbeat* objecting to a *Ripley's Believe It or Not!*

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broadcast touting W.C. Handy as the “father of the blues,” Jelly Roll Morton proclaimed, “I discovered jazz in 1902.” He was a little off on the dates—in 1902, he was in his very early teens—but his account of his contribution to the development of jazz was accurate.

His letter caused much laughter on 52nd Street, New York’s Swing Street. But it caught the attention of Alan Lomax, a Library of Congress archivist, who sat Jelly Roll before a microphone and a jug of whiskey in an empty Coolidge Auditorium. Night after night Jelly Roll played, sang, and talked a remarkable history of jazz and personal biography. “A throbbing stream of tropic chords flowed behind the deep voice,” Lomax recalled. “One could feel the back seats filling up with ghostly listeners.”

The letter also caught the attention of Hugues Panassié, whose *Le Jazz Hot* was the first serious analysis of jazz and the men who made it. Panassié arranged for a recording session at which Jelly Roll brought together fellow New Orleans musicians like the brilliant Sidney Bechet (clarinet and soprano sax) for a series of superlative recordings evoking an updated but still classic style and performance, the polyphony enhanced and enriched, with a solid 2/4 beat. On other recordings, Morton, solo at the piano, revived the beautiful sung

blues—including a song about himself: “I’m the winin’ boy, and I don’t deny my name.”

His 1939 dates with Jelly Roll’s New Orleans Jazzmen were perhaps his finest. Modern recording equipment caught what was lost in earlier records, retaining the felicity and the genius of Jelly Roll’s arrangements, loose enough to give room to the improvisations of band and veteran soloists. Two of the numbers sent us flying: “High Society” had been a marching-band piece whose

ing return to jazz and life. At those tremendous sessions, there was more than a little truth in Jelly Roll’s boast that he was the greatest.

But there was no tumult when Jelly Roll, still Mr. Jelly Lord, came back to Washington and U Street. Returning to New York and 131st Street, he lived on the \$15 a week an old friend sent him. Perhaps, he thought, things might be better in California; packing his belongings in a battered old Lincoln, he drove through blinding snowstorms and twice

JELLY ROLL MORTON PROCLAIMED, “I DISCOVERED JAZZ IN 1902.” HE WAS A LITTLE OFF ON THE DATES—BUT HIS ACCOUNT OF HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAZZ WAS ACCURATE.


long, swinging, and intricate solo had for generations been a test to be mastered by every New Orleans clarinet player before he could be admitted into the fraternity; here it was played first by Bechet on soprano sax and challenged by Albert Nicholas on his traditional instrument. “Oh, Didn’t He Ramble” was evocative of a Delta funeral—the dirge on the way to the cemetery, with moans and cries of “He rambled and he rambled, but the butcher cut him down,” then after the burial, the band reversing its aprons and striding out with a rous-

was almost killed on the icy roads. But it was the same story in Los Angeles. He tried to return to New Orleans, but he had no money. “Give the priests and all my friends my best regards,” he wrote his sister. “I will always remember you in my prayers.” He died on July 10, 1941. It was raining when he was buried. Three or four musicians mourned as he was lowered into an unmarked grave.

He was not forgotten for long. With the war’s end, a revival of New Orleans jazz restored Jelly Roll Morton to his proper place in jazz history and to the respect and enthusiasm of critics and aficionados. Collections of his records were issued on LPs and later CDs. They are in the shops today, or were when last I looked—the BMG collection; *Jelly Roll Morton: 1923-24*; *Jelly Roll Morton: Solo*; and, in a multi-disc set, *Sidney Bechet: 1932-43*, four tracks of his superlative 1939 recordings.

Jazz is dead, but the records are still there, and so is the winin’ boy, Mr. Jelly Lord—the greatest. ■

*Ralph de Toledano is a former editor of Newsweek and the author or editor of over 20 books, including Notes From the Underground: the Whittaker Chambers-Ralph de Toledano Letters, 1949-1960 and Frontiers of Jazz.*



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# No Way to Treat a Friend



Thirty years ago this month, America suffered her first defeat. Most people my age remember only too well the disgraceful and heartbreaking scenes

of South Vietnamese citizens begging in front of the United States embassy for entry. Those poor people had been our allies, but only the big shots got away.

They were desperate because they knew the price they would have to pay for trusting Uncle Sam. I had been in that miserable place and had made some friends. I've often wondered what happened to them. One thing is for sure. Soldiers like Colonel Mao, the most decorated officer of the South Vietnamese army, did not have an easy time of it. If he was not executed immediately, he must have spent at least 20 years in a "rehabilitation" camp learning the teachings of his namesake, the mass murderer.

A few years later, it was the Shah's turn. Once he fled Tehran, he became a pariah. Only one year before his fall, then President Jimmy Carter had called the Shah's country an island of peace in a turbulent sea and had praised the Shah as an enlightened leader. When the Shah was diagnosed with cancer, he flew to the United States for treatment, and all hell broke loose. Iranian students rioted right here in the Big Apple, and, as usual, the American government caved in. It was only through Henry Kissinger's efforts that he was allowed to finish his chemotherapy, and then he was shown the door.

The Shah had been a loyal friend to us, but geopolitical interests always come first. The German-born Kissinger knew better. Alliances and past friendships count, and as he wondered at the time, who will ever trust Uncle Sam again if we treat one of our best friends in that volatile part of the world as a non-person?

The Shah did not have a good end. In Panama, where the strongman Torrijos had given him refuge, he needed to leave in the dead of night once it became obvious why the dictator had taken him in: Torrijos had the hots for the Shah's wife. Only the president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, did the right thing. He welcomed the Shah and his family and treated them as a former head of state should be treated. The Shah died in Egypt and is buried there.

This brings me to the latest disgrace—the refusal by the United States to grant a visa to Sir Mark Thatcher, son of Lady Thatcher, probably the greatest friend this country has ever been lucky enough to have. Mark Thatcher is married to a Texan lady, and on those grounds alone should be allowed to enter and leave this country as he pleases.

The reason for the refusal was that Sir Mark poses a threat to Uncle Sam. Yes, dear readers, we have come down to this. U.S. anti-terror laws restrict visas for foreigners with criminal convictions, and Thatcher recently pleaded guilty in a kangaroo court in South Africa to having paid for a helicopter that—according to South African prosecutors—was to be used against the government of Equatorial Guinea.

Now let me be brief and to the point. (I wrote about the bloodthirsty tyrant Teodoro Obiang Nguema a few issues ago.) Equatorial Guinea is Africa's third-largest oil producer, and its citizens are the poorest in the African continent. Teodoro rakes it all in and spends it as he sees fit, on hookers, cars, planes, and houses outside his miserable country. A

gang of white mercenaries that couldn't shoot straight got together and decided to overthrow Teodoro in favor of an opposition leader living in exile in Portugal. They were caught before a shot was fired in anger when they landed in Zimbabwe on their way to Teodoro's country. Under torture, one of the mercenaries implicated Mark Thatcher. Sir Mark had been approached to pay for a helicopter ambulance and pleaded guilty in court, having struck a deal.

Whites do not have many rights in the dark continent nowadays, so Sir Mark did not have much of a choice. In most civilized countries, the case would have been thrown out of court. But a statement under torture by a mercenary was enough to get him into trouble.

What bothers me is the law of this country. It specifically states, "each case is assessed on an individual basis." So I ask you: if the Thatcher case was assessed on its merits, is it possible that Mark Thatcher, a rich, self-made man without a criminal record except for a plea bargain in a kangaroo court, poses a threat to the United States? Better yet, who is the terrorist? Teodoro, who has murdered, maimed, and stolen hundreds of millions from his country's coffers—most of them deposited in the Riggs bank in Washington, D.C.—or Mark Thatcher, who was foolish enough to think that overthrowing a tyrant was not such a bad thing?

There is no doubt in my mind that he is being made an example of by some immigration official for being white, self-employed, pro-West, and not about to enter the welfare rolls. Oh yes, I almost forgot. He's also a European, and son of the old continent's greatest prime minister of the 20th century. Of course he has to be refused entry. Last but not least, he also speaks perfect English, as good a reason to keep him out as I know of. ■



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


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